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ESSAYS ON INDIVIDUAL HEALTH INSURANCE MARKET:
ADVERSE SELECTION, SUBSIDY DESIGN AND PROVISION
Hongyu Zhang
Claudio Lucarelli
Subsidies are important policy tools against market failure in public health insurance pro-
grams. With the presence of adverse selection, subsidies of various forms encourage insur-
ance purchase by low-risk consumers and promote insurance coverage towards the socially
optimal level. In the context of the U.S. individual health insurance market, however, little
evidence quantifies the degree of adverse selection. Neither is there evidence about how
consumers value the subsidies, nor the overall welfare impact of subsidy provisions. This
dissertation studies the social welfare implications of subsidy provision in the individual
insurance market. I first quantify the degree of intensive margin adverse selection presented
in the Affordable Care Act (ACA) Health Insurance Marketplaces (the exchanges). Using
a novel dataset from a major U.S. insurer, I compare care utilization by individual market
enrollees with respect to coverage level with enrollees in the commercial small group market.
The coverage provision and consumer health status in the latter are the most comparable
to those in the individual market, and coverage choices are plausibly exogenous. I present
evidence of intensive adverse selection in the exchanges. I then study the design and em-
pirical implication of price-linked subsidies. I develop a theoretical model to illustrate how
the pass-through from cost shocks to subsidy payments depends on adverse selection and
competition. Then combining individual-level enrollment data from the California exchange
with the novel claims data, I quantify the pass-through in the exchanges. Lastly, I estimate
the value of providing the Cost-Sharing Reduction subsidy—a subsidy that increases cover-
age benefits—and compare the welfare consequences of this subsidy’s alternative financing
strategies. I find that removing the Cost-Sharing Reduction subsidy will discourage en-
iv
rollees in the lowest five percentile of health risk from obtaining insurance in the individual
insurance market; consequently, premiums will increase by 5%-10%. Financing of the Cost-
Sharing Reduction affects insurers’ incentive to participate in the market and, hence, total
social surplus. Providing Cost-Sharing Reduction under the federal budget generates the
highest total social surplus and achieves the highest return on public spending.
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CHAPTER 1 : Introduction
Adverse selection occurs if insurers cannot use information about consumers’ risk to price
premiums. Limiting insurers’ ability to risk rating reduces reclassification risk, but exacer-
bates adverse selection. As a result, it may cause underinsurance (Rothschild and Stiglitz,
1976) and market failures (Akerlof, 1970; Cutler and Reber, 1998; Hendren, 2013), ulti-
mately reducing social welfare. In health insurance, a principal regulatory goal is to limit
insurers’ ability of risk rating while managing adverse selection. The individual health insur-
ance market (exchanges) established under the Affordable Care Act (ACA) are a prominent
example where such goal drives policy interventions.
Subsidies are common regulatory tools in combating market failures in many health insur-
ance programs. Whether in Medicare Part D, Medicare Advantage, or the ACA exchanges,
subsidies of various forms encourage insurance take-up by low-risk consumers and pro-
mote insurance coverage towards the socially optimal level. Among many, linking subsidy
amount to certain plan premiums, or so-called price-linked subsidy, is constructed to limit
consumers’ exposure to premium changes, and thus became popular in many public health
insurance programs, including the ACA exchanges. Recent work has compared the fis-
cal impact of price-linked subsidies with “fixed” subsidies or the voucher systems that set
subsidies independently of premiums (Tebaldi, 2019; Saltzman, 2018). The choice of sub-
sidy design trade-offs between public budget and uninsurance and underinsurance caused
by unexpected supply-side cost shocks as well as its resulting externality (e.g., uncompen-
sated care). Jaffe and Shepard (2020), for example, discuss conditions that renders the
price-linked subsidies optimal in the Massachusetts Health Connector, the Massachusetts’
pre-ACA insurance marketplace.
Despite the similar subsidy structure between the Massachusetts Health Connector and
the ACA exchanges, evaluating the efficiency of price-linked subsidies in the latter is more
complicated. Unlike in the Massachusetts Health Connector, plans in the exchanges are
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vertically differentiated. Hence, targeting subsidy level to a certain type of plans will lead
to vertical substitution. With the presence of extensive adverse selection, the consequential
equilibrium effects may strengthen or weaken the economic trade-off reported in early liter-
ature. The interplay with market competition also adds another layer of complexity. Yet,
the theoretical analysis is scarce. There is little evidence quantifying the degree of extensive
adverse selection in the exchanges. Nor is there evidence about how exchange consumers
value the subsidies, and what is the overall welfare impact of the price-linked subsidies on
the exchanges.
This dissertation seeks to fill the theoretical and empirical gaps regarding the price-linked
subsidy design. The dissertation will consist of three chapters. In Chapter 2, I quantify the
degree of intensive adverse selection in the exchanges. Using a novel dataset from a major
U.S. insurer, I compare care utilization by exchange enrollees with respect to coverage
level with enrollees in the commercial small group market. The coverage provision and
consumer health status in the latter are the most comparable to those in the exchanges,
yet the coverage choices are restricted and plausibly exogenous. I find that adjusting for
health status difference, the individual health insurance market experiences a higher degree
of adverse selection at the intensive margin, and is mostly contributed by enrollees with
coverage less then a full year—either by delayed enrollment or active disenrollment. Between
2014 and 2017, the degree of adverse selection on the exchange almost doubled in our data.
Yet, lower utilization by individual enrollees in less generous plans and their predominating
enrollment share contribute to the overall market stability.
In Chapter 3, I investigate the price-linked design of premium subsidy and its pass-through
from a supply-side cost shock to subsidy payments. This chapter is motivated by the
Cost-Sharing Reduction (CSR) subsidy federal defunding that became effective in 2018.
Thanks to the defunding, the CSR cost responsibility was shifted from the government to
the insurers. Naturally, the insurers respond by raising the premiums of the affected plans.
Interestingly, the CSR cost shift affects the exact same type of plans whose premiums link
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to the amount of premium subsidies. Thus, the CSR cost shock sets a perfect empirical
environment to study the unintended consequences of the price-linked subsidy design. Com-
bining individual-level enrollment data from the California exchange with a novel claims
dataset, I jointly estimate the demand for coverage and the marginal costs to the insurers.
With those estimates, I simulate equilibrium premiums when the insurers incur a cost shock
due to the CSR federal defunding. Because each insurer offers multiple plans on the ex-
change, their decisions on how to increase premiums imply a different degree of alignment
with the price-linked design, hence varying the equilibrium effects and unintended economic
consequences. In the California exchange, the pass-through from a dollar of insurers’ cost
shock to subsidy spending is estimated to range from 1.2 to 2.1.
In the Chapter 4, I examine the value of providing the CSR subsidy and compare the welfare
consequences of this subsidy’s alternative financing strategies. I find that removing the CSR
subsidy will discourage enrollees in the lowest five percentile of health risk from obtaining
insurance in the individual insurance market; consequently, premiums will increase by 5%-
10% should CSR benefits are revoked. Financing of the CSR affects insurers’ incentive to
participate in the market and, hence, the total social surplus. Providing CSR under the
federal budget generates the highest social welfare and achieves the highest return on public
spending.
3
CHAPTER 2 : Adverse Selection in Individual Health Insurance Market
2.1. Overview
Adverse selection is one of the most important problems in health insurance markets. While
it is generally conveyed as a single concept—sicker individuals tend to exhibit higher de-
mand for insurance coverage—a deeper look reveals that it has two separate roles in health
insurance markets, each corresponding to a margin along which selection occurs. As the
extensive margin, adverse selection leads healthier people to opt out of health insurance
altogether; at intensive margin, adverse selection lead healthier enrollees to select into less
generous plans within the market. Each margin by its own leads to inefficiency in insurance
coverage. As summarized in Saltzman (2021), adverse selection at the extensive margin
may cause underenrollment whereas adverse selection at the intensive margin may cause
underinsurance. Moreover, in a market where coverage is vertically differentiated, the two
margins and their policy implications are not separable (Geruso et al., 2019). Specifically,
a policy targeting the efficiency problem at one margin will also affect the degree of adverse
select at the other margin, which in return has unintended effects that may intensify or
weaken the desired policy effect.
Quantifying adverse selection on both margins are particularly relevant to the ACA ex-
change policy discussion, since this individual insurance market has all elements that flag
a two-margin adverse selection problem1. Several policy interventions are implemented to
address efficiency issues at either end (e.g., the individual mandate for the extensive margin
concern, and risk adjustment for the intensive margin concern). At the extensive margin,
studies have found evidence of adverse selection and suggested that reducing the relative
prices of coverage–—either via a mandate penalty or premium subsidies–—attracts low-risk
individuals to purchase insurance on the exchange and moves coverage rate towards the
socially optimal level (Kolstad and Kowalski, 2012; Frean et al., 2017; Hackmann et al.,
1It offers multiple levels of coverage, each plan is in principle community rated with age adjustment
regulated by individual state.
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2015)2. At the intensive margin, however, evidence of adverse selection is lacking. Study
in this chapter aims to fill this literature vacuum. In particular, we are motivated by the
extreme provision inefficiency concern—market instability and ultimately market unravel-
ing. Should severe intensive adverse selection presents and persists, a disproportionally high
volume of high-risk enrollees would cause insurers’ ACA participation unprofitable and the
market unravels à la Rothschild and Stiglitz (1976).
At the time of writing, the exchanges have undergone seven years of operation under three
presidential administrations. Although the warning of market unravelling has unwound,
seeking for interventions that move the coverage level closer to the social optimal is a con-
tinual effort. In this context, understanding how intensive adverse selection presents in this
market as well as unpacking its driving factors is particularly important. In this chapter, we
provide answers to those questions by comparing care utilization among individual market
enrollees to utilization among employer-sponsored small group insurees who are covered by
actuarially similar products. We use small group enrollees as a “control” group to lever-
age their unique plan selection process—plan menu are pre-selected by the employers and
oftentimes limited in menu size and coverage span—to isolate utilization attributed to se-
lection in coverage generosity. We focus on total care utilization with additional analysis
on utilization by disease types and utilization of the emergency department.
Applying a difference-in-difference framework to a highly detailed proprietary data from a
large national insurer, we find the exchanges had experienced a higher degree of adverse
selection compared to the small group market. In particular, the average annual utilization
by exchange Bronze plans are estimated $2,482 less than that by small group Bronze plan
equivalent. The exchange Gold and Platinum plans, on the other hand, exhibit average
2Panhans (2019) also finds adverse selection at extensive margin conditioning on coverage level. In
particular, it finds a positive correlation between premiums and medical spending within a metal tier, and
it further draws causal inference using the border effect of rating area boundaries. This type of adverse
selection is in line with Finkelstein et al. (2012), where selection is detected by exogenous variations in
premium prices driving different levels of medical spending. This type of adverse selection focuses on
the relationship between prices and expected risk, holding coverage level constant. We denote this type of
adverse selection as infra-coverage extensive margin adverse selection. Mainly, we focus on the inter-coverage
extensive margin adverse selection, where variations in coverage levels drive differences in medical spending.
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annual utilization $2,608 and $8,616 more than the corresponding small group plans. Mea-
suring the intensive adverse selection as the utilization slope with respect to plan actuarial
values (AV) in the exchanges relative the slope in the small group market, we find the fol-
lowing: in the exchanges, a 10% increase in plan AV is associated with a $2,700 increase in
annual care utilization; in comparison, the same level of AV increase is only associated with
a $720 more utilization in the small group market. Moreover, we find a large proportion
of the detected adverse selection is due to exchange enrollees’ strategic choices in enroll-
ment and disenrollment timing. For instance, the utilization slope for exchange enrollees
with less-than-2-month coverage is estimated 2.36 times as steep as the slope for exchange
enrollees with full-year coverage.
The remainder of this chapter is organized as the follows. Section 2.2 surveys the existing
literature on adverse selection in the ACA exchanges. Section 2.3 introduces the background
and institution details of the ACA exchanges. In Section 2.4, we present our hypothesis,
estimation strategy, and the econometric models before describing our data and sample def-
inition in Section 2.5. Section 2.6 reports the main results and additional tests. In Section
2.7 we conclude.
2.2. Literature Review
There is a growing body of studies that investigate on-exchange individuals’ insurance
decisions. Frean et al. (2017) use American Community Survey (ACS) and Sacks (2018) uses
the Current Population Survey (CPS) to investigate factors that affect individuals’ decisions
to take-up insurance coverage. Saltzman (2018) studies how consumers respond to premium
when choosing plans from the California exchanges using individual-level enrollment data.
Equipped with claims data, more recent studies are able to further examine adverse selection
in enrollment decisions on the exchanges. Linking plan-level average costs with enrollment
data, Tebaldi (2019) shows heterogeneous adverse selection with respect to age groups in the
California exchange. Also using California data, Drake (2018) finds high-risk on-exchange
insurees adversely select into plans with a wider provider network. Panhans (2019) also
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reports adverse selection in the Colorado exchange.
This study makes the following contributions to the literature. First, it adds to the emerging
literature of adverse selection in the ACA exchange markets. We provide evidence of adverse
selection that high-risk insurees enroll in more generous plans in the exchanges. This finding
is related to adverse selection reported in Tebaldi (2019) and Panhans (2019). Unlike those
two papers that follow Einav et al. (2010) to test a positive relationship between average
costs and premium, we test a positive relationship between average costs and coverage in
the fashion of Chiappori and Salanie (2000) and Finkelstein and Poterba (2006). Moreover,
we leverage the unique data of commercially insured small group insurees as a reference
group to estimate the lower bound costs attributed to adverse selection. Second, we find
strategic enrolling and dis-enrolling behaviors by high-risk insurees. This finding relates to
the recent work by Diamond et al. (2018), who show that consumers rush to coverage for
their treatments and subsequently cease to pay premiums. Lastly, to our knowledge, this
is the first paper that investigates the relationship between condition-specific health risks
and plan coverage choice. We are also the first study that sheds light on the cost-sharing
reduction beneficiaries’ medical consumption patterns. Their plan choices and care utiliza-
tion have important implications for the federal budget.
2.3. ACA Exchanges: Community Rating and Tiered Products
In 2014, the ACA enacted individual mandate and instituted health insurance marketplaces
in each of the fifty states, where private insurers offer a variety of coverage options, and the
federal government provides subsidies for low-income participants. The individual mandate
requires that most U.S. citizens and legal residents obtain health insurance coverage. For
those not covered by public insurance or insurance through their employer, this mandate
requires them to purchase plans in the individual insurance marketplaces or pay a tax
penalty. The plans offered on the exchanges are required to fit into standardized “metal
tiers” based on actuarial value (AV): Bronze (60% AV), Silver (70% AV), Gold (80% AV),
and Platinum (90% AV). Products and prices are set and made public at the end of every
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summer, and individuals can then compare and purchase plans in their region during the
“open enrollment” period in the late months of each year. Coverage then lasts for the
subsequent calendar year. Individuals are also qualified for special enrollment period if
they experience certain life events such as losing health coverage, moving, getting married,
having a baby, or adopting a child.
Prior to the ACA, insurers were able to price the non-group insurance based on an indi-
vidual’s health status or medical history. Under the ACA, insurers cannot deny coverage
based on consumer’s preexisting conditions. The law also limits the ability of insurers to set
premiums only according to insurees’ age, geographic rating area, family composition, and
tobacco use. The community rating under the ACA opens the door to adverse selection in
various way. Among all, it becomes possible for the high-risk individuals to demand more
insurance without being priced more than low-risk but otherwise similar individuals. It also
permits individual to obtain insurance only when they expect high demand for care.
2.4. Methods
2.4.1. Commercial Small Group Insurees as a Control Group
We use commercial small group (SG) insurees as a control group of exchange enrollees, as
the former has coverage options most similar to those on the exchanges, yet has much more
limited plan menu to choose from. An insuree is defined as a small group insuree if he/she
obtained the coverage from an employer with 2 to 50 employees. In the data, SG employers
picked a menu either from the commercial small group market (99.2%), or from the ACA
exchange Small Business Health Options Program (SHOP)(0.79%). We limit the sample
only to the commercial SG enrollees to leverage their limited plan menu. Near half of SG
insurees in the data were only offered one option from their employer. Among SG insurees
who had multiple plan options, near 40% of them had their entire choice sets restricted to
a single coverage level despite having two or more plans to choose from. Among all SG
insurees, less than 70% of them faced a single-level coverage plan menu. The final data for
the control group only consist of SG insurees who face plan menu of a single coverage level.
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Their utilization serve as a benchmark of choices unaffected by intensive margin adverse
selection.
An attractive feature of this control group data is the observed actuarial value (AV) range of
each SG plan. Similar to on-exchange plans, SG plans have AVs ranging from 60% to 90%,
with common coverage differentiation around at every 10% AV increment. This feature
allows us to draw an equivalence between SG plans and exchange plans based on cover-
age levels (see Section 2.4.2 for details). Meanwhile, the availability of those options each
SG enrollee faced is very limited. Those features play important roles in the identification
strategy of this study. For a given enrolled tier, the SG enrollees did so due to plan menu
constraint set by their employers, whereas the exchange enrollees did so by active choices.
This contrast warrants the SG plans a natural control for the exchange plans in studying
the relationship between health risk and enrollment decisions. Specifically, because SG en-
rollees’ metal tiers are determined by their employers, we argue that their coverage level
is assigned nearly “as-if random.” Even though SG enrollees are priced under community
rating, the differences in consumption across plan richness do not indicate adverse selection
in SG. In comparison, the exchange enrollees face much richer choice sets and have access
to a wider range of coverage. Under community rating, those choice sets give rise to adverse
selection. The difference in medical consumption across plans of different generosity is thus
a combined result of adverse selection and moral hazard. Putting together, the difference
in medical consumption between the more- and less-generous plans among the exchange
enrollees net that difference among SG population points to the medical consumption asso-
ciated with adverse selection on the ACA exchanges.
2.4.2. Metal Tier and Metal Tier Equivalence
In this dataset, we observe the AV range of each SG plan. This unique piece of information
allows us to draw links between the on-exchange plans and SG plans based on actuarial
equivalence. Based on the AV of on-exchange plans, we categorize plans covering SG insurees
into Bronze-equivalent (∼60% AV), Silver-equivalent (∼70% AV), Gold-equivalent (∼80%
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AV), and Platinum equivalent (∼90% AV) tiers. This key connection allows us to effectively
control for coverage when comparing care utilization between the two populations, and then
identify adverse selection by testing the correlation between the utilization difference and
coverage.
Regardless of where the employers choose the plan menu, we found that the options the SG
employers provided for their employees are very limited. 45.8% SG insurees in our data were
only offered one option from their employer: near 50% of them were offered Gold-equivalent
plans, 30% were offered Silver-equivalent plans, 13% were offered Bronze-equivalent plans,
and rest were offered Platinum-equivalent plans.
2.4.3. Exchange versus SG Enrollees
The fact that an individual enrolls via the exchanges instead of an SG employer suggests
possible market-level selection. Although the strict exchange eligibility precludes shop-
ping between the SG market and the exchanges, having access to employer-sponsored plans
implies that compared to the on-exchange enrollees, SG enrollees may have more stable
employment, higher income, and higher education. All those demographic differences have
a positive correlation with health status. Moreover, better employment and/or education
may also suggest that should they enroll via the exchange, SG enrollees would conduct a
more active search of available plans and consequently make more informed plan choices
relative to the current on-exchange population. Both aspects are relevant to our identifi-
cation strategy and estimations. Before we dive into further discussion, however, we will
like to first go over the hypothesis and econometric specifications. Then we will return in
Section 2.5 to report how those potential differences are manifested in the data and discuss
how they affect the analysis.
2.4.4. Econometrics: a Difference-in-Difference Analysis
We hypothesize that the exchange enrollees exhibit a higher degree of adverse selection
compared to the SG enrollees. In particular, the difference between the mean utilization
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of those who enrolled in non-Bronze plans and the Bronze plans are larger among the
on-exchange population than among the SG population. If we linearize the relationship
between the mean care utilization and coverage generosity, adverse selection implies an
upward sloping line, and our hypothesis suggests a steeper slope exhibited by the exchange
enrollees than the SG enrollees.
Figure 1 illustrates two possible cases accordant with our hypothesis, where the difference
stems from whether the mean care utilization of the least generous plans (e.g. Bronze) are
lower among the exchange enrollees compared to the SG enrollees. There is no theoretical
support which case should be the priori. However, should premiums are similarly priced in
the two markets, the wide availability of premium subsidy to exchange enrollees suggests
those who choose the least generous plans on the exchange shall have lower risks and thus
care utilization than their SG counterparts. We thus expect to find a relationship similar to
Figure 1a. Conversely, shall the relationship in Figure 1b be the case, that is, the exchange
enrollees incur higher utilization across all coverage levels and exhibit a higher degree of
adverse selection, it is reasonable to believe that the exchanges are threatened by market
instability.
Adverse Selection in Plan Coverage
The differences in medical consumption across on-exchange tiers net the differences across
the SG control plans quantitatively measure the utilization attributable to selection. In
regression term, we perform a difference-in-difference analysis as the following:
Yims = λs + γm + βm(dm × d[s=HIX]) + X′imsη + εims, (2.1)
where Yims denotes utilization measurement for enrollment segment i in metal tier m,
m ∈ {b(ronze), s(ilver), g(old), p(latinum)}, via market segment s, s ∈ {HIX, SG}. The
set of utilization measurement and construction methods are described in Section 2.5. In
Equation (2.1), λs denotes the mean medical consumption for segment s, and γm denotes
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Figure 1: Illustration of the Hypothesized Relationships Between Coverage Generosity and
Mean Care Utilization
(a) Stable individual market (b) Unstable individual market
Notes: Panel 1a plots the hypothetical scenario, where the individual enrollees exhibit a higher degree of
adverse selection, and the Bronze exchange enrollees incur lower care utilization compared to small group
enrollees. Panel 1b plots the alternative scenario, where the individual enrollees still exhibits a higher degree
of adverse selection as before, but the Bronze exchange enrollees have higher care utilization compared to
small group counterparts.
the mean medical consumption for metal tier m. dm is the binary variable that equals 1
if the plan belongs to metal tier m. d[s=HIX] is the binary variable that equals 1 if the
individual is from the exchange and 0 otherwise. The covariate vector Xims includes a set
of insuree demographics, risk indexes (see Section 2.5)3, rating region fixed-effects, and plan
year fixed-effects. We cluster the error term at rating region level. In this specification,
we test whether, relative to SG insurees, on-exchange insurees exhibit a greater correlation
between medical consumption and insurance coverage.
The coefficients of interests are {βm}, which we interpret as the medical consumption at-
tributable to selection by the on-exchange population. By our hypothesis, we expect βb < 0
and βg > 0 or βp > 0.
3We include risk indexes instead of their logarithm forms because the linear form is native to the
construction of the original HHS-HCC score, which are based on a set of linear-linear regressions. The
Choice of linear or logarithm form makes a quantitative difference on our point estimation. Specifically,
logarithm form tends to overestimate the mean utilization of Bronze plans meanwhile underestimate slope
of non-Bronze plan utilization against coverage levels.
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Adverse Selection in Enrollment Duration
Private information is not only manifested in the choice of coverage but also on the timing
insurees choose to enroll and/or dis-enroll. As reported in Diamond et al. (2018), consumers
strategically sign up for insurance to help defray the costs of non-chronic, potentially dis-
cretionary, health care needs, and then drop coverage once they have satisfied these needs.
In our data, we also observe frequent early termination of coverage in both on-exchange
and SG populations. About 27% of our on-exchange observations leave their plan in less
than four months. Only a small proportion of the on-exchange insurees stay in the plan
until the expiration date. In comparison, the SG insurees also have fragmented enrollment,
but they have a much higher enrollment share with no early termination.
Early termination can be a channel of adverse selection. The reasoning is similar to that
discussed in Diamond et al. (2018), that insurees with private information on when he/she
will need medical care will choose to enroll only when the care is needed, and opt-out
once care is provided. In this case, the medical spending will be more concentrated for
individuals who enroll for a shorter period of time than a long one. Empirically, our per-
member-per-year (PMPY) medical consumption measurement captures the concentration
of care utilization.
We test the hypothesis that the on-exchange insurees with shorter enrollment duration
have more concentrated care utilization compared to SG counterparts. In an analog to our
difference-in-difference estimation, we estimate the medical consumption difference between
the longer and shorter exchange enrollment relative to the difference from the SG enrollment.
The variation in the length of SG enrollment periods serves as our identification, as the
enrollment and dis-enrollment in the SG segment is unlikely to correlate with changes in
SG individuals’ health risks. We also fully interact the effect of enrollment duration with
metal tier, as we want to separate selection in enrollment duration from selection in coverage.
Lastly, we control for the potential heterogeneous effect with respect to coverage. Formally,
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we estimate a triple difference model as the following:
Yilms = λs + γm + δl + φls + µlm + θms + βlm(dlm × d[s=HIX]) + X′ilmsη + εilms. (2.2)
We test βlm in Equation (2.2), a three-way interaction between enrollment duration l, metal
tier m, and market segment s. We categorize enrollment segments into four length groups:
less than 2 months, between 2 and 4 months, between 4 and 12 months, and 12 months
and more4. We use the longest duration category, 12 months or longer, as the reference
group. Similar to Equation (2.1), we include a set of enrollee demographics, rating region
fixed-effects, and year fixed-effects. We cluster the error terms at rating region level.
The coefficients of interests are {βlm}, which we interpret as the medical consumption con-
centration attributable to selection on enrollment duration by the on-exchange population.
Conditioning on non-bronze metal tier m, βlm indicates exchange enrollees’ additional uti-
lization concentration relative to that of SG enrollees in the same duration category l.
2.5. Data
Sample Population. This study will compare the positive correlation between medical
consumption and insurance coverage presented among the ACA exchange insurees and that
among the commercially insured small group insurees. we obtained detailed administrative
data on enrollment and medical utilization of those two populations from a major U.S.
insurer over the period from 2014 to 2017 when the insurer participated in the ACA exchange
in 14 states. This four-year panel covers 2,198,075 lives and 3,413,140 enrollment segments
insured from the exchanges, and 739,544 lives and 1,175,412 enrollment segments insured
from the commercial small group.
Table 1 presents the summary statistics of the sample population. On average, the exchange
enrollees have a higher share of female and are older. They are also more likely to be
4For on-exchange enrollees, the maximum enrollment length is 12 months. For small group enrollees,
some organizations renew plan in every two or three years, so we observe enrollment duration longer than
one year in this population.
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Table 1: Summary Statistics
Small Group Exchanges








Age, mean (sd) 34.3 (17.7) 41.3 (16.6)










Total N members 739,544 2,198,075
Notes: Prevalence of chronic and mental conditions are calculated using
diagnosis codes observed during enrollment.
diagnosed with diabetes and depression.
Enrollment. Figure 2 describes the enrollment of the exchange and the SG enrollees
over the study period. While the total enrollment fluctuates across plan year, the share
of each metal (and metal equivalent) is stable overtime. Among enrollment segment on
the exchanges, Bronze and Silver plans (including cost-sharing reduction plans) account for
31% and 62%, respectively; Gold and Platinum plans stably account for 5% and 1% of total
enrollment.
Our data show that the exchange enrollees favor low coverage plans such as Bronze and
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Silver, whereas the commercial SG enrollees exhibit preference of more generous plans such
as Gold- and Platinum-equivalent plans. Although SG is the commercial market where
the products are most actuarially similar to the on-exchange plans, Figure 2 suggests that
plans sold in SG market are still on average more generous than the on-exchange plans. This
highlights the importance of controlling plan coverage at individual level when comparing
the utilization between the two populations. Our unique data on SG metal tier equivalence
grants us the ability to do so, and attribute the utilization difference to market-specific
adverse selection.
Figure 2: Enrollment Share by Plan Coverage
Notes: This figure plots the enrollment shares of different coverage levels by the exchange and small group
enrollees. The enrollment shares are calculated based on enrollment segments. Multiple enrollment by the
same individual, whether within or across plan year(s), are account as separate enrollment segments. Metal
equivalence in the small group market are drawn based on observed plan actuarial values.
We distinguish Cost-Sharing Reduction (CSR) eligible Silver plans from standard Silver
plans because those plans have significantly reduced deductibles and/or out-of-pocket max-
imums from standard Silver plans. For eligible on-exchange households and individuals, the
cost-sharing reduction automatically reflects on their plan menus as high actuarial value
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Silver options (73% Silver, 87% Silver, and 94% Silver based on an insuree’s household in-
come). As a result, the CSR plans do not assemble compatible plans to neither the standard
on-exchange Silver plans, nor the equivalent Silver plans from the commercial SG market.
We thus separately them from other on-exchange plans in our empirical analysis. In the
robustness check, we alternatively treat CSR plans (1) the same as standard exchange Silver
plans and (2) standard Silver plans plus CSR benefit dummies. Coding of CSR plans barely
changes our results.
Care Utilization. We link each insuree’s detailed medical claims with eligible enrollment
segment and aggregate medical consumption incurred to the insurer at the individual-
enrollment level. We also group claims by ICD-10 chapter based on primary diagnosis
code. Because mental health and maternity care are part of the essential health benefit
(EHB), I separately aggregate medical utilization of those services for an additional set of
analyses. We also construct medical consumption measurement for musculoskeletal system
related diseases and circulation related diseases in a similar fashion, as some procedures of
those service types can be anticipated and are thus more vulnerable to adverse selection.
Table 2 summarizes the care utilization of the two populations.


















Bronze 35% 4.60 4,730 3,080 50% 3.35 2,931 1,475
Silver 31% 4.93 5,105 3,525 30% 4.94 4,523 3,155
Silver 73% 32% 4.80 4,243 2,887
Silver 87% 32% 4.91 4,752 3,254
Silver 94% 32% 4.98 5,072 3,468
Gold 27% 5.29 5,436 3,982 23% 5.76 6,319 4,891
Platinum 22% 5.72 5,886 4,570 21% 6.08 9,003 7,090
Total N members 739,544 2,198,075
Notes: This table reports the summary statistics of care utilization by the small group and exchange
enrollees, respectively. Care utilization is measured by per-member-per-year (PMPY) allowed amount,
which is the sum of medical spending paid by insurance plans and the consumers.
Risk Index. In addition to medical spending, we use the detailed diagnosis codes and
procedure codes to construct a novel risk index adapted from the hierarchical condition
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category (HCC) risk score developed by the Health and Human Services5. The original
HHS-HCC risk score “employs the hierarchical condition category grouping logic used in
the Medicare risk adjustment program, but with 254 HCCs refined and selected to reflect
the expected risk [of the non-elderly] population.” Also, the original HHS-HCC algorithm
is designed for the ACA risk transfer program. It thus accounts for insurers’ financial re-
sponsibility that differs by metal tier; potential adverse selection reflected in enrollment
duration; and additional utilization due to Cost-Sharing Reduction benefits. Because our
risk score index only aims to capture the differences in expected medical risks, it is calcu-
lated by only applying the HHS-HCC logic to assign scores based on enrollees’ age, gender,
and procedure and diagnosis code. In other words, the main risk score index used in this
paper does not adjust for enrollees’ choices of metal tier, enrollment duration, or enrollees’
CSR status. Summary statistics of risk index are reported in Table 3.










Bronze 0.87 -1.57 0.73 -1.35
Silver 1.00 -1.53 1.32 -1.17
Silver 73% 1.39 -1.05
Silver 87% 1.59 -0.93
Silver 94% 1.65 -0.92
Gold 1.09 -1.51 2.10 -1.03
Platinum 1.11 -1.50 2.55 -0.71
Total N members 739,544 2,198,075
Notes: This table reports the summary statistics of the HHS-HCC stype risk index among
the small group and exchange enrollees, respectively. Risk index is constructed according
to the procedure documented in Appendix A.1. Because basic demographics (i.e., age and
gender) comprise meaningful components in the risk index calculation, the risk index is
strictly positive for all enrollees.
5Construction of the risk index is documented in Appendix A.1.
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2.5.1. Differences between the Exchange and SG Enrollees
Now we return to the question left open at the end of Section 2.4.3. Summary statistics has
already shown that the exchange enrollees indeed differ from SG enrollees in their health
status. This will naturally implies a higher level of care utilization among the exchange
enrollees relative to SG enrollees. Hence, we include risk score in the covariates to control
for potential selection into markets based on differential health status to the extent that
can be captured by the HHS-HCC risk calculation algorithm6.
Employment status and income level, on the other hand, may suggest SG enrollees have
more disposable income for medical spending. Studies using the Social Security Notch to
study the effect of income on various measure of care utilization have reported income elas-
ticity substantially greater than 1 among the elderly (Moran and Simon, 2006; Tsai, 2018).
Although this study focuses on a much younger population, it is still reasonable to concern
that the income effect is positive in our sample. Due to data limitation, we are unable to
compare employment status and household income between the exchange and SG enrollees.
However, should the income difference in question exist, it is likely to downward bias our
estimations.
2.6. Results
Adverse Selection in Plan Coverage
Table 4 summarizes our main difference-in-difference estimates. Columns (1)-(2) show the
linear difference-in-difference estimation using the actual (unnormalized) care utilization as
the left-hand side variable. Between the two, column (1) reports the estimation of Equation
6The 254 Hierarchical Condition Categories (HCC) are selected only if the medical condition fall into one
of the following four criteria: (1) represent clinically-significant, well-defined, and costly medical conditions
that are likely to be diagnosed, coded, and treated if they are present; (2) are not especially subject to
discretionary diagnostic coding or “diagnostic discovery” (enhanced rates of diagnosis through population
screening not motivated by improved quality of care); (3) do not primarily represent poor quality or avoidable
complications of medical care; (4) identify chronic, predictable, or other conditions that are subject to
insurer risk selection, risk segmentation, or provider network selection, rather than random acute events
that represent insurance risk (Kautter et al., 2014).Those criteria ensures that our risk score measure does
not reflect individuals’ specific medical incidence risks, but rather the individual’s overall health profile based
on chronic conditions and/or demand for intensive treatment.
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(2.1) without controlling for the risk index whereas column (2) reports the same estimation
with risk score added to the coveriates7. Column (3)-(4) repeat the same exercise using
the annualized care utilization as the left-hand side variable. Following Einav et al. (2013),
we also repeat the first four specifications using a quasi-maximum likelihood (QMLE) Pois-
son model8 in columns (5)-(8) to address the econometric concern regarding the skewed
distribution of care utilization (Wooldridge, 1999).
We find that across all specifications, the coefficients of interest βms are significantly positive
for all non-Bronze metal tiers and increase with plan generosity. Controlling for risk index,
SG Silver plans’ annual medical consumption is $610 more than that of SG Bronze plans
(column (4)). In comparison, the Silver-Bronze annual utilization difference is $2,154 among
the exchange plans, more than tripling the difference in the SG market. Similarly, the
additional utilization relative Bronze plans are much higher among exchange Gold and
Platinum plans compared to their SG equivalents. Those estimates suggests a steeper slope
of care utilization against coverage generosity in the exchanges than in the SG market. In
particular, we estimate a 10% increase plan AV is associated with $720 increase in annual
care utilization among SG enrollees, whereas $2,700 increase among exchange enrollees. In
addition, we find the exchange Bronze plans on average incur $2,482 less spending compared
to the SG Bronze plans. As an essential part of adverse selection—the least risky individuals
select into the least generous plan when they are allowed to choose coverage level—this
finding completes our hypothesis testing. In Figure 3, we plots the predicted mean care
utilization of each metal tier and SG equivalents among exchange and SG enrollees. The
estimated relationships between care utilization and plan coverage resembles the one in
Figure 1a. All our findings provide clear evidence for a higher level of adverse selection
on the exchanges compared to the SG market. The dollar impact of adverse selection is
economically significant.
7The risk index is constructed without adjusting for selection in metal tier (as described in Section 2.5).
8The quasi-maximum likelihood (QMLE)-Poisson model requires only that the conditional mean be
correctly specified for the estimates to be consistent, thus is insensitive to the right-skewed distribution of
care utilization.
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Table 4: Difference-in-Difference Estimation: Adverse Selection in Coverage
OLS QMLE
Raw Utilization PMPY Raw Utilization PMPY
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Silver 337.4∗∗∗ 252.6∗∗∗ 745.3∗∗∗ 609.9∗∗∗ 0.125∗∗∗ 0.163∗ 0.150∗∗∗ 0.188∗∗∗
(79.75) (69.39) (182.6) (171.9) (0.0300) (0.0711) (0.0369) (0.0661)
Gold 975.7∗∗∗ 763.2∗∗∗ 1794.6∗∗∗ 1455.3∗∗∗ 0.342∗∗∗ 0.375∗∗∗ 0.347∗∗∗ 0.380∗∗∗
(83.68) (75.73) (222.9) (216.5) (0.0491) (0.0715) (0.0419) (0.0681)
Platinum 1410.4∗∗∗ 1041.8∗∗∗ 2438.8∗∗∗ 1850.3∗∗∗ 0.488∗∗∗ 0.522∗∗∗ 0.471∗∗∗ 0.505∗∗∗
(160.8) (128.1) (332.0) (309.1) (0.0491) (0.0856) (0.0584) (0.0826)
73% Silver 1278.1∗∗∗ 900.9∗∗∗ 2329.9∗∗∗ 1727.6∗∗∗ 0.547∗∗∗ 0.545∗∗∗ 0.642∗∗∗ 0.642∗∗∗
(48.65) (50.85) (91.81) (113.5) (0.0209) (0.0215) (0.0246) (0.0252)
87% Silver 1881.7∗∗∗ 1304.1∗∗∗ 3111.2∗∗∗ 2188.9∗∗∗ 0.729∗∗∗ 0.724∗∗∗ 0.793∗∗∗ 0.789∗∗∗
(60.93) (71.96) (106.6) (142.0) (0.0223) (0.0228) (0.0251) (0.0257)
94% Silver 2102.6∗∗∗ 1459.8∗∗∗ 3343.3∗∗∗ 2316.9∗∗∗ 0.800∗∗∗ 0.779∗∗∗ 0.842∗∗∗ 0.822∗∗∗
(61.49) (72.66) (104.7) (142.8) (0.0229) (0.0374) (0.0260) (0.0390)
IND -1117.0∗∗∗ -835.0∗∗∗ -2481.5∗∗∗ -2031.2∗∗∗ -0.487∗∗∗ -0.449∗∗∗ -0.682∗∗∗ -0.646∗∗∗
(93.07) (78.89) (182.8) (171.5) (0.0404) (0.0772) (0.0431) (0.0696)
IND×Silver 1107.2∗∗∗ 785.8∗∗∗ 2057.0∗∗∗ 1543.9∗∗∗ 0.476∗∗∗ 0.437∗∗∗ 0.586∗∗∗ 0.548∗∗∗
(98.59) (82.78) (223.7) (199.6) (0.0387) (0.0734) (0.0473) (0.0693)
IND×Gold 2909.4∗∗∗ 1824.4∗∗∗ 5090.2∗∗∗ 3357.8∗∗∗ 0.901∗∗∗ 0.822∗∗∗ 1.029∗∗∗ 0.952∗∗∗
(143.7) (151.4) (328.7) (383.0) (0.0412) (0.120) (0.0529) (0.109)
IND×Platinum 5444.3∗∗∗ 3866.6∗∗∗ 11098.0∗∗∗ 8578.9∗∗∗ 1.259∗∗∗ 1.211∗∗∗ 1.560∗∗∗ 1.513∗∗∗
(678.3) (532.1) (1630.7) (1416.4) (0.0981) (0.122) (0.123) (0.137)
Risk Index 433.9∗∗∗ 692.9∗∗∗ 0.00128∗∗∗ 0.00121∗∗∗
(41.10) (81.85) (0.000351) (0.000317)
Constant 1313.0∗∗∗ 938.8∗∗∗ 4361.5∗∗∗ 3764.0∗∗∗ 7.151∗∗∗ 6.894∗∗∗ 8.329∗∗∗ 8.144∗∗∗
(100.5) (92.56) (432.7) (391.4) (0.0442) (0.160) (0.0975) (0.143)
Observations 4588535 4588535 4588535 4588535 4588520 4588520 4588520 4588520
Standard errors in parentheses
* p<0.05 ** p<0.01 ∗∗∗ p<0.001
Notes: This table reports the estimations from Equation 2.1. In all specification, we also control for enrollees
age in a third degree polynomial, state fixed effects, and year fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered at
3-digit Zip code level.
Risk index is important to controlling for the demographic and health difference between the
two populations. Comparison between any pair of specifications that use the same left-hand
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variable (e.g. column (1) vs. (2)) suggests that exclusion of risk index will overestimate
both the level and the slope of utilization of exchange enrollees relative to the SG enrollees.
Figure 3: Mean Care Utilization by Market and Coverage Level
Notes: This figure plots the main estimation of Equation 2.1. The connected squares (in blue) and the
connected hollow circles (in red) represent the mean effect of plan coverage level on care utilization by market
segment measured by per-member-per-year (PMPY) total spending by insurers and consumers. Bars show
the 95% confidence intervals using standard errors that are clustered by enrollees’ 3-digit Zip code.
Lastly, utilization concentration may vary within and across metal tier(s). Although the
average enrollment duration is about 8 months and similar between the exchange and SG
enrollees (Table 1), our sample shows a higher proportion of exchange enrollees who enroll
for less than a full plan year—they enrolled late, actively disenrolled before coverage nat-
urally terminated, or did both. Within each metal tier, a shorter enrollment duration is
found to associated with higher average risk. For example, the average exchange Platinum
enrollees who enrolled for less than 2 months had utilization ranked at 38th percentile, while
those who enrolled for the full plan year had average utilization percentile of 70th. Pairwise
comparison between estimations using unannualized and annualized care utilization as the
left-hand side variable provides additional evidence on how such selection in enrollment
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Notes: This table reports ratios ∆m,SG =
λSG, annualized+γm,annualized
λSG, raw+γm,raw




among exchange enrollees. λs and γs are points esti-
mates from Equation 2.1.








. Note that ∆m,· is a unit-free measure of
care concentration. The lower the ∆m,·, the higher the utilization concentration. However,
it does not reflect the degree of adverse selection with respect to coverage level.
Table 5 reports ratios ∆m,· for each market segment and metal tier. Our estimations reject
the null hypothesis that utilization concentration are invariant to coverage generosity. Not
only the ratios vary substantially across the two population, but also they vary by metal
tiers within each population. Among exchange enrollees, Platinum enrollees have the high-
est utilization concentration (as in our main analysis, we exclude CSR Silver variations as
they lack compatible SG plans), whereas Bronze enrollees have the lowest concentration.
The pattern is similar among the SG enrollees, except the utilization concentration is more
extreme. Those findings point to the next set of analysis: selection with respect to enroll-
ment duration.
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Adverse Selection in Enrollment Duration
Table 6 reports the results of the triple-difference estimations. The column and row names
correspond to the metal m and duration category l of the triple difference coefficient βlm.
Each cell presents the estimated βlm, where column (1)–(4) are results from the linear
model, and column (5)-(8) are results from the quasi-maximum likelihood Poisson model.
Recall that we use enrollment with a full year length or longer as the reference group, also
that we use per-member-enrollment-per-year (PMPY) spending to measure utilization con-
centration. The coefficient to the three-way interaction term βlm is interpreted as the care
utilization concentration attribute to adverse selection in enrollment duration l conditioning
on the adverse selection associated with metal tier m. As expected, {βlb} are negative for all
enrollment duration in the linear model. For exchange Silver plans, utilization concentra-
tion decreases in enrollment duration; however, only the point estimate for the 2-4 month
enrollment is statistically significant. For Gold and Platinum exchange plans, the utiliza-
tion concentration peaks at 2-4 month enrollment. In general, the linear model suggests
that the exchange enrollees with shorter period of coverage have higher annualized medical
consumption than their SG counterparts. Not only the enrollment of longer duration is
associated with lower point estimates βlm, but also smaller difference between high and low
metal tier pairs (mHl ,m
L
l ).
In comparison, the QMLE model suggests that the linear estimations may be influenced by
extreme values. Contrary to highly statistically significant estimates in the linear model,
the QMLE estimates are only significant for Silver enrollees with less than 2 months of
coverage, Platinum enrollees with less than 2 months of coverage, and Platinum enrollees
with 2 to 4 months of coverage. Moreover, based on the QLME model, the exchange
Gold enrollees with enrollment shorter than 4 months have less utilization concentration
attributable to selection compared to exchange Silver enrollees. This is the opposite of
what the linear model suggests. It is likely that high point estimates in the linear model is
driven by extreme values. The distribution of utilization concentration do not statistically
significantly vary by enrollment duration.
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Table 6: Triple-Difference Estimation: Adverse Selection in Enrollment Duration
OLS QMLE
Bronze Silver Gold Platinum Bronze Silver Gold Platinum
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Three-way interaction coef.: IND×Metal×Duration
less than 2 months -2623.9∗∗∗ 1521.9 2887.7∗ 8496.8∗∗ -0.496∗ 0.315∗ 0.277 0.410∗
(539.0) (1033.0) (1241.7) (2914.3) (0.0926) (0.155) (0.144) (0.175)
2 to 4 months -1106.7∗∗ 992.8∗ 3914.2∗∗∗ 11736.3∗∗∗ -0.208∗ 0.171 0.130 0.582∗∗∗
(402.8) (495.3) (670.7) (2800.4) (0.0859) (0.105) (0.413) (0.158)
4 to 12 months -89.75 124.9 1203.1∗∗∗ 2872.8∗∗∗ 0.0625 -0.0537 0.0450 0.0943
(206.9) (232.0) (293.7) (591.0) (0.184) (0.178) (0.176) (0.184)
Three-way interaction reference -1324.5∗∗∗ 1075.2∗∗∗ 1882.1∗∗∗ 4266.9∗∗∗ -0.525∗∗∗ 0.494∗∗∗ 0.873∗∗∗ 1.283∗∗∗
(IND×Metal) (149.9) (171.6) (347.1) (656.8) (0.0481) (0.0464) (0.0494) (0.0942)
Risk Index Y Y
Year FE Y Y
State FE Y Y
Observations 4,588,535 4,588,535
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p<0.05 ∗∗ p<0.01 ∗∗∗ p<0.001
Notes: this table reports the key estimates from Equation 2.1. In all specification, we also control for
enrollees age in a third degree polynomial, state fixed effects, and year fixed effects. Coefficients to two-way
interactions and main effects are estimated but not reported. Standard errors are clustered at 3-digit Zip
code level.
Figure 4 visualizes the triple DID estimation. In all enrollment duration categories, exchange
enrollees consistently exhibit a higher degrees of adverse selection relative to SG enrollees,
and all hypotheses regarding {βm} are supported. Moreover, the slope of the annualized
care utilization against coverage generosity noticeably decreases in enrollment duration for
both exchange and SG plans. Among exchange enrollees and SG enrollees respectively, the
slope decreases from $3,420 PMPY per 10% AV increments to $1,450 PMPY per 10% AV
increments, and from $2,050 PMPY per 10% AV increments to $460 PMPY per 10% AV
increments. The rate of declining is faster among exchange enrollees.
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Figure 4: Mean Care Utilization by Market, Coverage Level, and Enrollment Duration
Notes: This figure plots the main estimation of Equation 2.2. The connected squares (in blue) and the
connected hollow circles (in red) represent the mean effect of plan coverage level within perspective enrollment
duration categories. Care utilization are measured by per-member-per-year (PMPY) total spending by
insurers and consumers. Bars show the 95% confidence intervals using standard errors that are clustered by
enrollees’ 3-digit Zip code.
Interpreting the triple DID results, whether the linear or the QMLE estimation, requires
additional assumption. Unlike the choices of coverage level, SG enrollees’ decisions on en-
rollment duration, especially whether and when to disenroll, can be a decision at both
employer and enrollee levels. In our data, we only observe the departure of an SG enrollee
from his/her employer-sponsored plan. Such observation can be due to (1) the enrollee left
the current employment, (2) the employer discontinued the coverage such that all covered
employees left the corresponding plan all together, or (3) the enrollee chose to opted out
the employer-sponsored plan and switch to other option (e.g. his/her spouse’s insurance
plan). While the first case does not invalidate the SG enrollees as a control group, the oth-
ers introduce adverse selection either at the firm or individual level, hence attenuating our
results. In fact, SG enrollees’ decreasing slope with respect to enrollment duration suggests
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possible selection in this population. Thus, the results from the both the DID and the triple
DID estimations are plausibly biased.
Restricted Sample: Full Enrollment
To exclude the potential selection among the SG enrollees in the enrollment duration di-
mension, we repeat the DID analysis using full enrollment individuals. This reduces our
sample to 597,024 lives and 1,103,143 enrollment from the exchanges, and 195,598 lives
and 413,840 from the SG market, respectively. Table 7 shows that our main results hold
in the restricted sample, both in the linear point estimates and the QMLE model that
estimates the distribution parameters. Compared to previous DID results, the linear rela-
tionships between utilization and coverage level are flattened for both the exchange and SG
enrollees (Figure 5). For a 10% AV increment, annual utilization increases by $440 for SG
enrollees and $1,560 for exchange enrollees. Moreover, utilization by Silver SG enrollees is
not statistically different from that by Bronze SG enrollees, both by the point estimation
of mean (column (2)) and by the estimation of the distribution parameter (column (4)).
The utilization difference between SG Gold and Platinum enrollees is not statistically sig-
nificant, either. Nevertheless, the higher utilization by SG Gold enrollees relative to SG
silver enrollees still suggests some remaining adverse selection in the full-year SG sample.
On average, exchange Bronze enrollees spend $1,271 less compared to SG counterparts.
Exchange Silver enrollees have similar utilization as SG Silver enrollees and the difference
are not statistically different from $0. Mean utilization diverges again in Gold and Platinum
plans, in a magnitude of $883 PMPY and $3,106 PMPY, respectively.
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Table 7: Difference-in-Difference Estimation: Restricted Sample
OLS QMLE
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Silver 362.4∗ 172.5 0.0896∗ 0.145
(157.5) (127.7) (0.0388) (0.122)
Gold 1228.5∗∗∗ 826.0∗∗∗ 0.286∗∗∗ 0.354**
(162.5) (132.4) (0.0389) (0.114)
Platinum 1555.5∗∗∗ 899.8∗∗∗ 0.366∗∗∗ 0.476∗∗∗
(215.9) (185.5) (0.0487) (0.106)
73% Silver 1962.4∗∗∗ 1243.0∗∗∗ 0.534∗∗∗ 0.514∗∗∗
(92.42) (75.65) (0.0249) (0.0235)
87% Silver 2782.1∗∗∗ 1707.7∗∗∗ 0.700∗∗∗ 0.674∗∗∗
(93.89) (79.98) (0.0234) (0.0230)
94% Silver 3188.3∗∗∗ 1953.0∗∗∗ 0.787∗∗∗ 0.756∗∗∗
(105.9) (92.65) (0.0251) (0.0265)
IND -1867.1∗∗∗ -1271.0∗∗∗ -0.510∗∗∗ -0.381∗∗∗
(180.0) (131.4) (0.0499) (0.102)
IND×Silver 1847.8∗∗∗ 1224.7∗∗∗ 0.498∗∗∗ 0.420∗∗∗
(183.5) (142.7) (0.0467) (0.123)
IND×Gold 4163.6∗∗∗ 2154.1∗∗∗ 0.863∗∗∗ 0.764∗∗∗
(247.2) (189.7) (0.0497) (0.114)
IND×Platinum 7384.7∗∗∗ 4377.7∗∗∗ 1.240∗∗∗ 1.098∗∗∗
(952.4) (595.6) (0.102) (0.128)
Risk Index 583.8∗∗∗ 0.00250∗∗∗
(25.08) (0.000228)
Constant 1715.0∗∗∗ 1336.7∗∗∗ 7.427∗∗∗ 7.310∗∗∗
(176.2) (140.6) (0.0510) (0.104)
Observations 1515957 1515957 1515955 1515955
Standard errors in parentheses
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, ∗∗∗ p<0.001
Notes: This table reports the key estimations of Equation 2.1 using only full-
year enrollment segments. In all specification, we also control for enrollees’ age
in a third degree polynomial, state fixed effects, and year fixed effects. Standard
errors are clustered at 3-digit Zip code level.
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Comparison between the full sample and the restricted sample estimations revels the direc-
tion and magnitude of the bias from failing to acknowledge the potential selection in the
SG market. We find that ignoring selection in SG market biases the estimation away from
the null. The remaining adverse selection among the SG enrollees may arise at employer
level. For instance, firms with higher average health risks tend to choose a plan menu of
more generous options for its employers. Although not a perfect test, we compare the uti-
lization of full-enrollment SG enrollees whose employers changed the coverage level in plan
menu during our studied period. Although we find that menu changing is only associated
with $10 (S.E. 148) increase in annual care utilization, the difference is not statistically or
economically significant.
Figure 5: Mean Care Utilization by Market and Coverage Level: Restricted Sample
Notes: This figure plots the main estimation of Equation 2.1 using only full-year enrollment segments.
The connected squares (in blue) and the connected hollow circles (in red) represent the mean effect of plan
coverage level within perspective enrollment duration categories. Care utilization are measured by total
spending by insurers and consumers. Bars show the 95% confidence intervals using standard errors that are
clustered by enrollees’ 3-digit Zip code.
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2.6.1. Additional Analysis and Robustness Check
As stated in the previous section, ignoring the potential selection among the SG control
group will result in an overestimation of both the level and the slope of the mean care uti-
lization curve for exchange enrollees. We hence use the restricted sample (full-enrollment
segments for both populations exclusively) to conduct the analysis in this section.
Cost-Sharing Reduction (CSR) Silver Plans
Cost-Sharing Reduction (CSR) Silver plans are Silver plan variations available on the ex-
changes. Compared to standard Silver, CSR Silver offers discounted deductibles, copay,
and coinsurance, hence increases the actuarial value (AV) above the standard 70%. CSR
plans are only available to low-income individuals. Depending on the enrollee’s household
income, Silver plans appear in his/her choice set in one of the following form: standard
Silver, 73% AV Silver, 87% AV Silver, or 94% AV Silver.
In the baseline model, we treat CSR Silver variations as separate metal tiers from the
standard Silver. The main concern is that the wide range of those CSR plans may change
eligible enrollees’ care utilization behaviors as they face very different sets of incentives
as opposed to standard Silver enrollees (Aron-Dine et al., 2015). We repeat our main
difference-in-difference analysis while making no distinction between the standard Silver
and the CSR variations. The comparison shows a substantial difference in the interaction
coefficient β(m=Silver) resulting from the fuzzy treatment of the CSR plans.
In the rest of this section, we turn our attention to the care utilization pattern of those
non-standard plans and their roles in our analysis. We consider the medical consumption
by CSR plans as a linear combination of consumption common to all Silver plans and
consumption specific to CSR plans’ actuarial level. As reported in Table 7, column (2)
and (4), care utilization varies largely among the CRS plans. Compared to the enrollees of
standard Silver plans, enrollees of the 73% Silver plans spend $321 less than the standard
Silver enrollees; 87% Silver enrollees $93 more, and 94% Silver enrollees spend $338 more.
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The pattern also holds in the QMLE Poisson model.
The coefficients to the CSR plans seem to tell a story of adverse selection, moral hazard,
and socioeconomic status, or a mix of the three. It is puzzling why the 73% incur less
expenditures compared to less-generous standard Silver plans (70%). Similarly puzzling is
the increase in expenditures from the 87% Silver to 94% Silver non-linearly with respect to
the AV. It is possible that both risk preference and risk type play roles in the CSR plan
spending pattern (Fang et al., 2008; Finkelstein and Poterba, 2006). If both risk averse
individuals and high-risk type individuals enroll in generous CSR plans, we may find large
spread of care utilization, where the right tail of the distribution is extended by the high-
risk type, and the left-end mass consists of risk-averse individuals. In a set of tests not
reported, we find for the 87% Silver and 94% Silver enrollees, the majority of them have
realized health risks and utilization pattern very similar to standard Silver enrollees, even
though their plan actuarial values are more close to a Platinum plan.
The heterogeneous spending patterns across and within the Silver CSR variations have im-
portant implication to our analysis. Although understanding the mechanism behind those
patterns requires a formal model of risk type and risk preference, and it is beyond the scope
of this chapter, treating CSR variations the same as the standard Silver can overlook the
different risks not fully identifiable by the SG control population.
Adverse Selection by Service Type
To investigate how adverse selection varies by service type, we aggregate utilization by
disease category according to each claim’s associated ICD-10 service chapters9, and annu-
alize those service-specific consumption at enrollment level. Figure 6 illustrates the average
spending share of each service type within a metal tier across our study period. Among
all service types, consumption of childbirth related services and metal health services grow
faster in plan coverage, with exceptions of CSR plans. For all types of CSR plans, their med-
9For claims data in 2014 and 2015, we convert the ICD 9 codes to ICD 10 equivalence.
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ical consumption decomposition by service types is not statistically different from standard
Silver plans, but is significantly different from Platinum plans, which have the most similar
actuarial value as the 87% Silver and 94% Silver. Proceeding this section, we investigate
the utilization of 7 service categories using the same DID estimation as in Equation (2.1).
We will discuss the findings on childbirth as well as mental health utilization. The full set
of results are presented in Table 8.
Figure 6: Utilization Share by Service Category
Maternity Care is the type of service that can be anticipated by the insurees, yet the
insurer has little information on the utilization likelihood. Using our DID specification
with restricted sample, we find that at enrollment level, plan coverage is associated with
higher level of utilization of maternity care in both the small group and the on-exchange
population. On average, we find a Bronze exchange enrollee spend no more than than a SG
Bronze enrollee on childbirth. Although the other DID coefficients are statistically positive,
their economic significance is low. For example, the annual utilization difference between
Platinum and Bronze enrollees on the exchange is only about $60 higher than the difference
32
in the SG market.
Since childbirth is a service category perfectly vulnerable to information asymmetry on
utilization timing, we use the full sample to conduct the triple difference specification in
order to investigate the magnitude of adverse selection on the time dimension. We find
that the exchange Gold enrollees with 2- to 4- month coverage have the most concentrated
maternity care utilization due to adverse selection. Compared to the SG controls with a full-
year coverage, those Gold exchange enrollees spend $612 (S.E. = $217) more annually. The
exchange enrollees with coverage of 4 to 12 months has slightly less concentrated utilization
($202, S.E. = $81.77) , but still significantly higher than those with full-year coverage. We
repeat both DID and triple difference analysis further restricting to female enrollees, which
is not a practical price discrimination neither on the exchange nor in the SG market. Doing
so, however, does not substantially change the point estimates in neither specifications, nor
does it change the significance level.
Mental Health and Related Service. Mental health exhibits a substantially high in-
crease in utilization share. Table 8 column (3) reports the DID results of mental health
related service. The exchange Silver, Gold and Platinum all incur higher mental health uti-
lization compared to the SG controls. The dollar amount attributable to adverse selection
per enrollment is $68, $206 and $498, respectively. The excess utilization by the exchange
Platinum enrollees is driven by enrollees with less-than-a-year coverage. Using the un-
restricted data, we find a full-year exchange Platinum enrollment has about $702 more
metal health utilization compared to a full-year SG Platinum enrollment. In comparison,
a less-than-2-month exchange Platinum enrollees have $6,247 more annualized utilization
compared to SG counterparts.
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Table 8: Difference-in-Difference Estimation by Service Type: Restricted Sample
Birth Related Neoplasms Mental Health Circulatory Respiratory Digestive Musculoskeletal
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Silver 5.629 -30.28 52.11∗∗∗ 13.38 2.298 3.526 25.75
(5.269) (32.41) (10.50) (33.95) (11.91) (16.69) (29.10)
Gold 19.81∗∗∗ 18.74 91.49∗∗∗ 33.24 6.461 68.36∗∗∗ 112.0∗∗∗
(5.868) (31.17) (12.28) (35.39) (10.36) (18.16) (30.70)
Platinum 14.80∗ 59.06 77.50∗∗∗ 20.37 10.71 24.05 138.4∗∗∗
(6.949) (50.70) (21.28) (45.78) (12.42) (18.49) (37.06)
73% Silver 17.93∗∗∗ 82.52∗∗ 90.58∗∗∗ 62.43∗ 22.69 100.0∗∗∗ 223.1∗∗∗
(3.156) (26.95) (11.27) (29.70) (11.59) (14.87) (17.89)
87% Silver 26.83∗∗∗ 95.62∗∗∗ 139.1∗∗∗ 0.232 34.51* 133.3∗∗∗ 296.6∗∗∗
(3.693) (20.85) (15.95) (22.45) (14.27) (13.02) (16.48)
94% Silver 36.76∗∗∗ 77.64∗∗∗ 161.8∗∗∗ -18.44 50.76* 115.2∗∗∗ 366.4∗∗∗
(3.599) (20.85) (16.99) (27.11) (21.47) (12.45) (20.04)
HIX -1.419 -122.7∗∗∗ -19.88∗ -60.69 -34.01∗∗ -82.92∗∗∗ -269.2∗∗∗
(4.608) (31.02) (9.969) (33.59) (11.34) (16.94) (31.06)
HIX×Silver 14.76∗ 102.8∗∗ 67.69∗∗∗ -36.73 19.40 84.21∗∗∗ 221.0∗∗∗
(5.996) (36.39) (16.61) (39.90) (16.64) (20.62) (32.99)
HIX×Gold 24.42∗∗ 26.57 206.2∗∗∗ -133.2∗ 2.859 116.7∗∗∗ 322.5∗∗∗
(8.283) (41.28) (26.67) (64.02) (23.28) (30.71) (38.97)
HIX×Platinum 58.56∗∗∗ 147.7 498.4∗∗∗ -197.6∗ 75.21 272.3∗∗∗ 373.3∗∗∗
(11.72) (88.37) (116.6) (99.34) (96.83) (65.43) (54.13)
Risk Index 0.600∗∗∗ 53.91∗∗∗ 3.237∗∗∗ 90.03∗∗∗ 27.43∗∗∗ 25.31∗∗∗ 8.552∗∗∗
(0.0765) (3.682) (0.308) (10.07) (6.487) (2.636) (1.322)
Constant -29.45∗∗∗ 1.396 96.95∗∗∗ 68.11 133.5∗∗∗ -30.80 29.65
(6.117) (33.35) (18.06) (35.21) (19.79) (19.77) (36.68)
Observations 1515957 1515957 1515957 1515957 1515957 1515957 1515957
Standard errors in parentheses
* p<0.05 ** p<0.01 ∗∗∗ p<0.001
Notes: This table reports the estimations of Equation 2.1 with service-specific utilization using only full-
year enrollment segments. In all specification, we also control for enrollees’ age in a third degree polynomial,
state fixed effects, and year fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered at 3-digit Zip code level.
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Figure 7: Mean Care Utilization by Service Type: Restricted Sample
Notes: This figure plots the main estimation of Equation 2.1 by service type using only full-year enrollment
segments. The connected squares (in blue) and the connected hollow circles (in red) represent the mean
effect of plan coverage level within perspective enrollment duration categories. Care utilization are measured
by total spending by insurers and consumers. Bars show the 95% confidence intervals using standard errors
that are clustered by enrollees’ 3-digit Zip code.
Utilization of Emergency Department and Inpatient Care. We categorize utiliza-
tion of the emergency department (ED) and inpatient care into three types: (1) care that
is initiated in an ED admission and does not transfer to inpatient care, (2) care that is
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initiated in an ED admission that later transfers to an inpatient admission, and (3) care
that is initiated in an inpatient admission. For each of the three types, we restrict sample to
full enrollment and analyze the pattern of enrollment-level utilization across different levels
of plan coverage. The results are reported in Table 9 columns (1)-(3). The key DID coeffi-
cients are only significantly positive for ED utilization only (column 1). This suggests that
netting out the benchmark ED usage by the SG control population, more ED resources are
utilized by the high-coverage exchange plans. The increasing DID estimates from Silver to
Platinum assemble a pattern of adverse selection. However, interpreting this pattern purely
due to selection of ED service can be misleading. First, ED visits are not anticipatory, and
it is unlikely that individuals choose their plan coverage based on expected ED utilization.
Second, ED usage is positively correlated with health risk. The higher ED utilization can
be a mere reflection of the higher risk the on-exchange individuals adversely selected into
more generous plans.
To test whether the ED utilization is subject to adverse selection, we conduct two additional
enrollment-level utilization measures. Taking advantage of the full claims data, we follow
the New York University Emergency Department Algorithm (NYU-EDA) (Billings et al.,
2000; Johnston et al., 2017) to classify the ED visits that are emergent and not preventable,
and visits that are non-emergent10. We perform a Poisson regression to estimate a DID
specification where the dependent variable is the total number ED visits, number of emer-
gent ED visit, and number of non-emergent ED visits. The results are reported in columns
(4)-(6). For all non-CSR tiers, the emergent ED visits specific to the exchanges increase in
metal tier. This is consistent with the hypothesis that the positive relationship between the
exchange specific ED expenditure and coverage generosity reflects the average higher health
risk in those more generous plans. On the other hand, we find that relative to SG plans,
the exchange Gold and Platinum plans involve significantly greater volume of non-emergent
10The NYU ED algorithm classifies ED visits into four exclusive categories, increasing in ED care rele-
vance: non-emergent, emergent but primary care treatable, emergent but ED care is needed, and emergent
and ED care is needed. In this paper, we only choose to examine the two categories at the two extremes in
order to unambiguously distinguish necessary and unnecessary ED visits.
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Silver 43.83*** -20.49 -116.6 0.111*** 0.0906* 0.0820*
(10.00) (29.23) (102.8) (0.0281) (0.0357) (0.0393)
Gold 83.09*** 38.70 -13.74 0.225*** 0.228*** 0.209***
(9.901) (34.71) (107.8) (0.0280) (0.0345) (0.0380)
Platinum 95.15*** -14.09 -145.5 0.231*** 0.241*** 0.204***
(14.20) (42.21) (135.3) (0.0359) (0.0457) (0.0553)
73% Silver 104.0*** -21.27 122.1* 0.338*** 0.361*** 0.323***
(9.503) (19.85) (54.42) (0.0239) (0.0301) (0.0366)
87% Silver 174.9*** -10.60 106.6* 0.580*** 0.611*** 0.622***
(8.845) (22.75) (51.29) (0.0210) (0.0257) (0.0308)
94% Silver 262.1*** -2.519 141.6** 0.850*** 0.870*** 0.948***
(12.38) (22.27) (48.96) (0.0205) (0.0271) (0.0292)
HIX -48.02*** 8.760 -130.3 -0.159*** -0.162*** -0.146***
(11.69) (29.75) (101.5) (0.0313) (0.0404) (0.0434)
HIX×Silver 45.72*** 38.69 177.5 0.176*** 0.218*** 0.145**
(10.80) (36.59) (110.2) (0.0344) (0.0451) (0.0503)
HIX×Gold 136.6*** -121.7* 69.22 0.458*** 0.487*** 0.459***
(15.47) (57.69) (139.5) (0.0349) (0.0454) (0.0485)
HIX×Platinum 217.5*** -113.2 819.0** 0.773*** 0.762*** 0.851***
(32.87) (80.08) (269.8) (0.0636) (0.0821) (0.0831)
Risk Index 7.862*** 56.47*** 368.9*** 0.00174*** 0.00174*** 0.00172***
(0.471) (9.391) (21.95) (0.000108) (0.000109) (0.000106)
Constant 98.32*** 107.8*** 215.9* -2.199*** -3.846*** -3.431***
(15.29) (29.17) (109.9) (0.0367) (0.0468) (0.0505)
Observations 1515957 1515957 1515957 1515194 1513648 4534329
Standard errors in parentheses
* p<0.05 ** p<0.01 *** p<0.001
Notes: This table reports the estimations of Equation 2.1 with the emergency department (ED) and related
utilization using only full-year enrollment segments. In all specification, we also control for enrollees’ age in
a third degree polynomial, state fixed effects, and year fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered at 3-digit
Zip code level.
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ED visits. Those non-urgent care sought in ED setting provides behavioral explanation of
the high relative ED utilization by the exchange high coverage plans. We also note that the
three types of CSR enrollees show a different pattern in ED utilization compared to other
service utilization that we have previously investigated. As noted in Section 2.6.1, the three
types of CSR silver plans shows different medical consumption pattern compared to the
standard Silver. Relative to the standard Silver plans, while the 73% Silver has about the
same level of utilization, and the 87% and 94% Silver spends slightly more. On the other
hand, the latter two types, although have actuarial values similar to a standard Platinum
plan (∼90% AV), have much lower medical consumption in comparison.
The pattern that CSR silver variations incur the same or higher utilization compared to the
standard Silver but far less than the actuarially similar Platinum plans (Figure 8) repeats
to show in our analysis of service-specific utilization (Table 8 and Figure 7). In ED utiliza-
tion, however, we find such pattern no longer holds. Not only all three types of CRS plans
have greater shares of ED utilization compared to the standard Silver, but also the level of
additional ED utilization share increases substantively with respect to plan actuarial value.
Using small group Platinum (90% AV) as reference, the estimated relative ED utilization
of a typical 94% CSR Silver plan is close to that of a typical exchange Platinum. Even for
the 73% CSR Silver, which is mostly actuarially similar to the standard Silver (70% AV)
and has average ED utilization lower than the standard Silver, when we use the small group
Silver (70% AV) as a control, its relative ED utilization is more than twice as much as that
by the standard exchange Silver.
Time Trend of Selection in Coverage Level
Our data includes the first four years exchange data uncontaminated by later exchange
policy changes such as the federal defunding of the CSR subsidies (applied in 2018) and the
mandate appeal (applied in 2019). A natural question to ask is how the degree of adverse
selection on the exchange evolves overtime. To answer that question, we use the restricted
sample to examine the adverse selection in plan coverage year-by-year. Because we exclude
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Figure 8: Mean Emergency Department and Inpatient Care Utilization:
Restricted Sample
Notes: This figure plots the estimation emergency department and inpatient care utilization from Equation
2.1 using only full-year enrollment segments. The connected squares (in blue) and the connected hollow
circles (in red) represent the mean effect of plan coverage level within perspective enrollment duration
categories. Care utilization are measured by total spending by insurers and consumers. Bars show the 95%
confidence intervals using standard errors that are clustered by enrollees’ 3-digit Zip code.
SG enrollment segments whose observed ending dates are exactly on December 31st, 2017
to avoid right censoring of utilization data, the restricted sample would exclude all SG
enrollment starting in 2017 as they are deemed as less-then-full enrollment by construction.
Figure 9 presents the estimated time trend. For SG enrollments the slope of annual uti-
lization with respect to coverage level is stably between $380 PMPY to $530 PMPY per
10% AV increment. Exchange enrollment, in comparison, shows a much wider range of
utilization slope, ranging from $1,220 in 2015 to $2,000 in 2016. The magnitude in 2016
is particular striking and seems to carry over to 2017. Although we lack a longer panel to
inform more about the time trend, we explore the possible explanation by examining the
consumer-paid premiums purchasing insurance from the exchange.
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Figure 9: Trend of Relative Adverse Selection on the Exchanges: Restricted Sample
Notes: This figure plots the care utilization patterns by plan year. The year-specific utilization level are
estimated using the same fashion as Equation 2.2, with the third difference replace by interactions with plan
years. The analysis is conducted using only full-year enrollment segments. SG enrollees starting coverage in
2017 are excluded in the restricted sample because by data construction and inclusion criteria none of those
SG enrollees enroll for a full plan year. The connected squares (in blue) and the connected hollow circles
(in red) represent the mean effect of plan coverage level within perspective enrollment duration categories.
Care utilization are measured by total spending by insurers and consumers. Bars show the 95% confidence
intervals using standard errors that are clustered by enrollees’ 3-digit Zip code.
Premiums
We start with summarizing the premiums the insurer charges exchange and SG enrollees,
meaning premiums without the advance premium tax credit (APTC) for exchange enrollees,
and premiums that SG employers and employees jointly pay. Because premiums are adjusted
by age in both markets, in Table 10 Panel A we report the average monthly premium for
a 21-year-old enrollees (the baseline premiums) weighted by enrollment. Although we lack
observations of SG full-enrollment in 2017 in the restricted sample, we summarize the
premiums of other SG enrollment and report in the rightmost column.
In 2014, the exchanges started with lower average baseline premiums in all coverage level
compared to the SG market. While the SG premiums are stable over the studied period, the
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Table 10: Premium Average by Market, Plan Coverage, and Year
Panel A: Avg. premium received by the insurer for a 21-year-old enrollee
Exchange SG
2014 2015 2016 2017 2014 2015 2016 2017*
Bronze 188 191 204 242 250 247 267 270*
Silver 246 248 253 298 294 308 308 308*
Silver 73% 244 244 250 293
Silver 87% 242 244 247 293
Silver 94% 241 241 243 289
Gold 290 286 313 388 347 344 376 377*
Platinum 319 329 373 460 434 456 449 450*





2014 2015 2016 2017 2014 2015 2016 2017*
Bronze 218 216 203 266 284 282 297 277*
Silver 214 186 143 204 322 343 329 303*
Silver 73% 353 271 285 374
Silver 87% 381 328 338 429
Silver 94% 400 367 362 446
Gold 194 137 114 167 368 368 394 359*
Platinum 146 96 104 151 451 439 454 413*
Notes: Panel A summarizes the monthly premiums received by the insurer for a 21-year-old enrollee
in each market and enrollment year weighted by enrollment volumne. Exchange enrollment and SG
enrollment before 2017 are reported using only full-year enrollment segments. Due to data construc-
tion, SG enrolment segments in 2017 are right-censored on December 31st 2017, thus does not com-
prise full-year enrollments. However, we report the average premiums received by the insurer in 2017
from less-than-full SG enrollment in the rightmost column as an approximation. We did not find the
average SG premium to vary by enrollment duration. Panel B summarizes the enrollee-paid premiums
by market and enrollment year. The reported sample is the same as in Panel A. For the exchange en-
rollees, we reported the monthly premiums after applying the advanced premium text credit (APTC),
which we directly observe in the data. For the SG enrollees, we do not observe the employers’ or the
employees’ contribution of the premium payments. According to Kaiser Family Foundation’s report,
we assume a 25% employers’ contribution in SG monthly premium, and we report the corresponding
average of employees’ payment in Panel B.
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exchange premiums increases steadily overtime, with 30%, 21%, 34%, and 44% increase in
Bronze, Silver, Gold, and Platinum premium from 2014 to 2017, respectively. Because the
exchange enrollees are heavily subsidized, we turn to Panel B to examine their out-of-pocket
premiums, the premiums after applying the premium subsidies, which we directly observe
in our data.
Since we summarize the enrollee-paid premiums of the chosen plan instead of the enrollee-
paid premiums of the plan choices, the reported numbers reflect the combined result of fairly
priced premium for coverage, the enrollee’s age, selection, and premium subsidies applied to
the insurance purchase that decrease in income. For example, the enrollee-paid premiums
for Bronze plans averaged at $218 per month in 2014, in contrary the enrollee-paid Platinum
premiums is about $145 per month. In general, we observe the mean enrollee-paid premiums
decrease in coverage level (except the CSR Silver plans). Seemingly counter-intuitive, this
is plausible when disproportionately many low-income hence heavily subsidized enrollees
choose more generous plans. For example, suppose that a plan menu consists of a Bronze,
Silver, Gold, and Platinum plan with monthly premium of $188, $246, $290, and $319,
respectively. For an enrollee A with $100 monthly premium subsidies, his/her out-of-pocket
premiums are $88, $146, $190, and $219 instead. For an enrollee B with identical health
status, observable demographics, preferences for premium and coverage, but receiving $260
monthly premium subsidies, his/her out-of-pocket premiums become $0, $0, $30, and $159.
For the same set of plans, A and B face different premium levels and relative premiums
across plans, with the former affecting his/her likelihood to purchase any insurance, and
the latter affecting which plan he/she chooses. Hence premium subsidies can entail the
negative correlation between the likelihood to choose a generous plan and the enrollee-paid
premiums.
Between 2014 and 2017, the average enrollee-paid premiums form a U-shape pattern for
each coverage level. While it coincides with the time trend of on-exchange adverse selection
measured by the relative utilization slope against coverage, enrollee-paid premiums appears
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not sufficient to explain the substantively steepened slope in 2016 continued in 2017. Al-
though beyond the scope of the current study, identifying the mechanism why the degree
of adverse selection on the exchanges varies in observed pattern is worth of further investi-
gation, and will be left for future research.
Price Difference: the DID Pre-Trend
Studies have found substantial prices variation across regions, across hospitals within in
regions, and even within hospitals (Cooper et al., 2018). Since our utilization is defined by
the dollar value of services charged to plans and enrollees, if the exchange individuals face
higher prices than the SG individuals for the same service provided by the same provider,
our results would overestimate the adverse selection effect. In this section, we test if prices
faced by the two populations are the same. In the context of our emperical estimation, this
is analogous to testing the parallel pre-trend assumption for our DID framework. We define
price as the total spending—the sum of patient paid and plan paid amount—resulting from
each procedure identified by the current procedural terminology (CPT) code. We use CPT
procedure code and provider NPI number to identify procedure-provider pairs. In our data,
we observe 1,798 distinct procedures performed in 17,928 facilities or offices. We restrict
our attention to procedure-provider pairs with at least 30 encounters among both the on-
exchange insurees and the SG individuals. To test our pre-trend, we regress the raw prices
on year-month time shocks γt, procedure-provider fixed effects λp, and critically the main
effect of procedures being offered to exchange insurees (Equation 2.3). We cluster errors at
procedure-provider pair level.
Priceispt = γt + λp + θs=HIX + εispt (2.3)
We find that the average price is about $6 less for exchange enrollees in an outpatient
setting, and $20 less in an inpatient setting. To examine the variation in mean price dif-
ferences across procedures and providers, we fully interact the on-exchange indicator with
each procedure-provider pair, controlling the year-month time shocks. We then compare
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the mean prices that the two populations face for each procedure-provider pair. We find
no significant price difference for 77% of 63,690 procedure-provider pairs; about 18% of
pairs have average prices significantly higher for the SG insurees, and only 5% of pairs have
average prices higher for the exchange insurees. For those procedure-provider pairs with
significant different mean prices, we weight those differences by encounter volume and find
the exchange insurees on average spend about 2% less than the SG insurees for a given
procedure. Although statistically significant, the lower average price for the exchange in-
surees is economically insignificant compared to the size of estimated adverse selection. The
finding that exchange enrollees do not spend more than the SG for a given procedure by a
given care provider suggests our results are not attenuated by prices. Relative to the SG
plans, the greater difference in medical expenditures between exchange plans of different
generosity is due to their greater volume of care utilization.
2.7. Conclusion
In this chapter, we estimate the extent to which adverse selection is present in the individual
market. We use commercially insured small group enrollees as a “control” to leverage their
unique plan selection process—plan menu are pre-selected by the employers and oftentimes
limited in menu size and coverage span. We compare care utilization among individual-
market enrollees to utilization among small group enrollees insured with actuarially similar
product in a difference-in-difference framework to isolate care utilization due to intensive
adverse selection on the exchange. We find the exchanges had experienced a higher degree
of adverse selection compared to the small group market. Measuring the adverse selection
as the utilization slope with respect to plan actuarial values (AV) in the exchanges relative
the slope in the small group market, we find the slope among the exchange enrollees is 3.75
times as steeper as the slope among the SG enrollees. A large proportion of the detected
adverse selection is due to exchange enrollees’ strategic choice of when to enroll and how long
to stay in coverage. In particular, we find that the utilization slope for less-than-2 month
exchange enrollees is 2.36 times as steep as the slope for the full-year exchange enrollees.
44
Restricting our analysis to full-year enrollment to both markets allows us to isolate selection
with respect to enrollment timing and duration. It also precludes possible employer-level
selection in the small group market, which we find biases our results upward. With the
full-year restricted sample, we still find a higher degree of adverse selection presented in
the exchanges. For a 10% AV increment, the annual utilization increases by $440 for SG
enrollees compared to $1,560 for exchange enrollees.
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CHAPTER 3 : Design and Pass-Through of Price-Linked Subsidies
3.1. Overview
The design of linking subsidy level to a targeted price intends to protect consumers from
unexpected price surges due to supply-side cost shocks. Popular in many public insurance
programs (e.g. Medicare Part D), the price-linked design is also used in the ACA advanced
premium tax predict (APTC, hereby premium subsidy) and comprises one of the most
important policy intervention aiming to attract low-risk and low-income individuals to the
exchanges. It affects 85% population who had effectuated coverage through the exchanges
(KFF) and amounts to about $27 billion in federal budget (CBO, 2017). During the first
three years’ operation, the price-linked subsidies have helped keep premiums affordable to
consumers meanwhile kept the government spending in a reasonable range.
The turning point came in 2018, when the Trump administration terminated the federal
payments for the Cost-Sharing Reduction (CSR) subsidies. Under the current legislation,
CSRs are extra benefits entitled to low-income individuals if they purchase certain ex-
change plans. Coincidentally, premiums of those CSR-qualified plans link to the level of
premium subsidies. In other words, premiums shocks to CSR qualified plans shall be off-
set by premium subsidies by design. Indeed, when the federal CSR defunding shifted the
cost burden—$10 billion nationwide—to insurers, subsequent changes in the listed premi-
ums, consumer paid premiums and government’s premium subsidy payments manifested
the case. On the one hand, without the buffer by the price-linked premium subsidies, pre-
mium surges post the policy shock are likely to discourage many from obtaining insurance
on the exchanges. On the other hand, when cost shocks are of this scale, the competitive
and budgetary implication become both economically and politically important.
So far, many questions regarding the design and economic consequences of price-linked
subsidies remain unanswered. For instance, in a market like the ACA exchanges where
multiple levels of coverage are offered, the price-linked design de facto fixes the consumer-
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paid price(s) of the targeted product(s) and reduces the relative consumer-paid prices of
the non-targeted products. Therefore, it disrupts all products’ demand, despite seemingly
isolating the cost shocks to the targeted products. How such effect influences insurers’
multiple product pricing strategy, especially with the presence of intensive margin adverse
selection, is a key efficiency factor of policy design. From a fiscal standpoint, the pass-
through from the nominal value of cost shocks to government’s additional subsidy payments
is also of policymakers’ interests.
This chapter is motivated by the price-linked premium subsidy in the ACA exchanges, where
the recent CSR cost shocks triggered the price-linking mechanism of premium subsidy and
resulted in a higher premium subsidy payment more than sufficient to offset the defuned CSR
payments. Using the exchanges’ empirical setting, this study will be the first that examines
the consequences of a price-linked subsidy design in the ACA exchanges, where products
are vertically differentiated, adverse selection presents (see Chapter 2), and an exogenous
policy change introduced cost shocks. In such a market, changes in relative premiums
lead marginal consumers to substitute across coverage levels. The resulting changes in
the average costs have equilibrium effects that may strengthen or attenuate the subsidy
pass-through. This study shows that equilibrium effects matter and have important fiscal
implications.
In this chapter, I first use a simple model to illustrate the pass-through of price-linked sub-
sidies in Section 3.2. Bringing to the empirical context, I then summarize the two types of
subsidies in the exchanges—one is the price-linked premium subsidy in question, and the
other one is the source of the cost shock—in Section 3.3. I estimate the pass-through of the
ACA exchange premium subsidies: in Section 3.5 I describe the model, and in Section 3.6




This section uses a standard discrete choice model of demand for multi-product insurers
to describe the pass-through of a price-linked subsidy design. The conditions for insurer
profit maximization show why under adverse selection and market power, a dollar increase
in marginal cost will lead to a greater increase in premium prices, hence a greater-than-a-
dollar increase in per-capita premium subsidy payments.
Insurers f = 1, . . . , F ∈ F each offers two plans of different coverage level k = L,H ∈ K.
The set of all plans is denoted as J = F ×K. Conditioning on the coverage level, plans are
horizontally differentiated. Each insurer competes by setting a price vector Pf = 〈PLf , PHf 〉.
Let P k = {P kf }f∈F denote the collection of premiums of all plans with coverage level k.
Without loss of generosity, I model the premium subsidy to be determined by a pre-specified
formula of the high-level plan prices PH , such that a consumer receives a subsidy S(PH)
and applies it to all plans on the market. This stylistic setting is analogous to a simplified
exchange market that only sells bronze (L) and silver (H) plans, and the premium subsidies
are linked to silver premiums. In such a market, subsidy-eligible consumers make enrollment
decisions based on plan coverage and post-subsidy premium prices, P cons = {PLc , PHc}
where P kc = {P kf − S(PH)}f∈F for coverage level k.
On the exchanges, subsidies are linked to the second-lowest-cost-silver-plan (SLCSP, a.k.a.
the benchmark silver plan) premium in each market. In particular, the policymaker wants to
ensure that the post-subsidy premium of the benchmark silver plan equals an pre-determined
“affordable amount,” such that S(Psilver) = PB.M. − AffAmt. Mimicking this subsidy for-
mula, I let
S(PH) = PHB.M −AffAmt. (3.1)
48





1 if firm f offers the benchmark H plan
0 otherwise
. (3.2)
Total demand for plan j(f,k) ∈ J , Qkf (P cons) is a function of all product premiums. I assume









f − ckf ). (3.3)
ckf denotes the averages costs of plan j(f,k), and it is a function of all consumer-paid premiums
and exogenous cost shock ∆, ckf (P
cons,∆). Implicitly, it allows risk selection to affect
premium pricing, such that ckf depends on the set of consumers who purchase j(f,k), which
is affected by its own coverage level and premiums of all plans.













dP kf︸ ︷︷ ︸
adverse selection
= 0, for k ∈ {L,H}. (3.4)
Here, insurers’ premium pricing enters the demandQkf only indirectly through the consumer-









































When firm f offers the benchmark plan, the total derivative of demand with respect to





, that comes from increased
premium subsidies. Equivalently, it is the effect of decreasing all consumer-paid premiums
by a unit amount of Qlf . The subsidy effect is positive, weakening the own price sensitivity
∂QHf
∂PHcf










































I analyze the effect of price-linked subsidy design on cost-shocks-to-subsidy pass-through
using the first-order condition as in Equation (3.4), which holds before and after cost shocks














































∈ [0, 1) for k = k′.
The partial derivatives with respect to other premiums (k 6= k′) deserve expanded dis-
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cussion. Without any change in premium subsidy, a higher PHf will leads the marginal
consumers who are indifferent between H and L to choose L. Those H-to-L switchers have
costs higher than the existing L plan enrollees. Thus the primary effect of a higher PHf on
cLf is non-negative. At equilibrium, a higher c
L
f will likely result in a higher P
L
f , causing
low-risk L plan enrollee to disenroll, further increasing cLf .
On the contrary, a higher PLf causes the marginal consumers to switch to plan H. Those
L-to-H switchers have costs lower than the existing H plan enrollees. Hence the primary
effect of a higher PLf on c
H
f is non-positive. Geruso et al. (2019) has detailed discussion









If firm f offers the benchmark plan, the total derivative of average cost with respect to PHf





that summarizes the effect higher premium subsidies
due to the price link. By lowering all consumer-paid premiums by a unit amount, it lowers
average costs of plan L and increases average costs of plan H (due to the equilibrium effect
of a lower QHf ).




























has an ambiguous sign.
This section aims to evaluate the pass-through from a cost shock of the benchmark plan
to subsidy payment. In the final step, assume for the H plans j(·, H), ∂cH∂∆ = 1 and for L
plans j(·, L) ∂cL∂∆ = 0. Recall that
dS
dPHf
































































Equation (3.9) quantifies the pass-through from supply-side cost shock to subsidy under a
price-linked subsidy design. The sign of numerator of the second term on the right-hand
side determines whether the pass-through is less or greater than 1.
Proposition 1. Even in the absence of adverse selection, the pass-through is unbounded.
























































































Note that the signs of both numerator and the denominator are undetermined. Specifically,


















The sign of the numerator depends on the same set of parameters plus the substitution





d∆ is one element of the vector {
dPj
d∆ } that solves the linear system expanded from Equation
(3.12) by stacking over all plans j ∈ J . The difference between the benchmark plan offering
insurer and its competitor plays only via the total derivative of demand with respect to the
listed premium of H plan,
dQL,Hf
dPHf
. Yet, the sign and the magnitude of the pass-through
dPHf
d∆ depend on how consumers substitute within the insurer that offers the benchmark
plan (the denominator) and how consumers substitute to other insurers in the market (the
numerator). I leave the belabored solution with adverse selection outside of this chapter, as
it only adds additional terms in both denominator and numerator to express the equilibrium
effect of marginal enrollees substitute across insurers and coverage generosity. The added
complexity, however, does not change the current inclusive result of the pass-through.
Remark. The proposition ties closely to market power how it is affected by adverse se-
lection. A higher market power, especially the subsidy-linked plan, implies a higher pass-
through from cost shock to subsidies. Although the statement is in the same spirit of
Mahoney and Weyl (2017), who shows that under adverse selection, higher market power
implies a higher producer surplus, the existing literature has little discussion on the role
of such a relationship in subsidy design. Jaffe and Shepard (2020) is the study closet to
ours, where their theoretic framework shows the price-linked subsidy design results in higher
market power of the benchmark plan. On the other hand, our model focuses on how such
market power affects the increase in subsidy payments in response to cost shocks.
In the rest of this chapter, I will empirically estimate the pass-through from cost shocks
to subsidy using a policy-induced cost shock in the ACA exchanges. Section 3.3 provides
background information on the ACA exchanges, the design of its price-linked subsidies, and
the cost shocks that trigger the price-linked mechanism. Section 3.4 summarizes the data.
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Section 3.5 describes the structural model and estimation method. Section 3.7 presents the
results.
3.3. Price-Linked Subsidies in ACA Exchanges
3.3.1. Subsidies in the Exchanges
The ACA offers two types of subsidies—premium subsidies and cost-sharing reduction
(CSR) subsidies—to low-income households to improve coverage and care affordability.
Both subsidies play important roles in CSR de-funding. In this section, I first introduce the
structure of each type of subsidy. Then I summarize the CSR subsidy de-funding in 2017
and the response by insurers in Covered California.
Premium Subsidies. Premium subsidies are discounts on consumers’ monthly premium
payments for households with incomes at or below 400% of the Federal Poverty Level
(FPL)1. The subsidy amount equals the difference between the benchmark plan premium
and the consumer’s income contribution cap. The benchmark plan is the second-cheapest
silver plan (SLCSP) available to the consumer. The consumer’s income contribution cap
ranged from 2% of annual income for a consumer earning 100% of the FPL and 9.5% of
annual income for a consumer earning 400% of the FPL. Consumers can apply the premium
subsidy towards the premium of any non-catastrophic metal plan on the exchange. The
figure 10a presents a graphic illustration of the premium subsidy rule. Because the subsidy
amount is linked with the SLCSP premium, all else equal, any change in the SLCSP premium
will directly translate to a same-size change in premium subsidy.
Although the income contribution cap is set by the Internal Revenue Service (IRS), pre-
miums for the SLCSP depend on the plan menu, thus vary by rating area, county, and
even ZIP code. Not all eligible households receive premium subsidies. It is also possible for
households with the same income to receive a different amount of premium subsidies if they
1If any household member is offered employer-based coverage, members in that household are not eligible
for premium subsidies.
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live in a different ZIP code and see different SLCSP premiums. The premium subsidies are
by law financed by the federal government.
Cost-Sharing Reduction (CSR) Subsidies. CSRs reduce the out-of-pocket cost-sharing
when low-income silver enrollees seek care. In addition to the premium subsidies, households
with income below 250% of the FPL receive CSR subsidies if they enroll in a silver plan.
Those households face a lower copay, coinsurance, deductible, and out-of-pocket maximum.
Reductions in cost-sharing increase a silver plan’s actuarial value to above the 70% standard.
Specifically, households with income falling in the 100-150%, 151-200%, and 201-250% of the
FPL range will receive CSR benefits that boost the actuarial value of a standard silver plan
to 94%, 87%, and 73%, respectively (Figure 10b). CSRs automatically reflect on the plan
menu when eligible households shop on the exchange. Appendix ?? shows the difference
in plan benefit design between a standard silver plan and a CSR silver plan. Although the
source of financing is not specified in the ACA, the realized difference in copay, coinsurance,
deductible, etc., between a standard silver plan and a CSR silver plan has initially been
paid by the federal government until the third quarter of 2017.
3.3.2. Termination of the Federal Payment for CSR Subsidies
A lawsuit initiated by the U.S. House of Representative Republican members in November
2014 sought to terminate direct federal CSR funding. The suit claimed that Congress had
not appropriated the money to fund the CSR payments. In October 2017, the federal
government terminated CSR subsidy payment, although the ACA still requires insurers
to provide CSR benefits to eligible consumers. This policy change forced the insurers to
internalize the non-reimbursable CSR subsidy as costs.
Insurers’ response makes the CSR defunding suitable to investigate the price-linked sub-
sidy pass-through. In about 45 states, insurers raised silver premiums to fund the CSRs, a
solution known as “silver loading.” The rationale behind this is precisely the link between
silver premiums and premium subsidies. Because premium subsidies peg to the benchmark
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Figure 10: Premium subsidies and Cost-Sharing Reduction subsidies
(a) Premium subsidies (b) CSR subsidies summarized by actuarial
values
Notes: Panel (a) shows how premium subsidies are calculated and applied at the purchase of coverage.
The purple line indicates the premium of the benchmark silver plan (SLCSP). In 2017, the average SLCSP
is $284/month. The premium subsidy is calculated as the distance between the SLCSP and households’
monthly contribution cap; the latter increases household income. For a household with an income of 150%
FPL, their monthly contribution cap is $61 month. This household receives $223/month premium subsidies
(gray vertical line) and can use them to purchase any on-exchange non-catastrophic plan (black vertical line).
A household with an income of 300% FPL has a monthly contribution cap of $288/month. Even though
they are eligible for premium subsidies, they will not receive premium subsidies because their contribution
cap exceeds the SLCSP. Panel (b) summarizes CSR subsidies by metal tiers’ actuarial values with respect
to enrollee income. CSR subsidies only apply to households with income below 250% FPL and only if they
enroll in a silver plan.
silver plan (SLCSP) premiums, increasing silver premiums altogether will simultaneously
increase the level of premium subsidies. Consumer-paid premiums thus shall be little af-
fected among the subsidized. While several studies report substantial premium increases
and enrollment decision changes in 2018, (Anderson et al., 2019; Drake and Anderson, 2020;
Rasmussen et al., 2019), those outcomes are not separable from insurers’ diminished par-
ticipation. In California, for example, Anthem left 16 markets in 2018 and narrowed its
offering to plans in more restrictive networks in the remaining three markets. However, we
know little about how such “silver loading” governs insurers’ premium pricing. Nor do we
know how the premium increases and market participation in return affect premium subsidy
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payments. According to CBO (2017), the government spent more due to the increased pre-
mium subsidy payments, which outweigh the savings from CSR payments. What explains
those additional spending and the extent to which it can be alleviated are of both economics
and policy interests.
This study focuses on Covered California, a state-run individual health exchange market.
In addition to federal regulations, California requires standardized benefit designs for all
on-exchange plans. The state regulators anticipated the federal CSR payment discontinu-
ation and coordinated insurers to “load” silver premiums in 2018. I test and confirm such
pricing strategy, showing that conditioning on the market and insurer, the silver premium
increases in California 2018 are driven by the predicted CSRs based on previous premiums,
average costs, and CSR beneficiaries’ enrollment share.
3.4. Data
The empirical work in this paper draws from several data sources.
Enrollment and Outside Options. I obtain individual-level enrollment data through a
public records act request under the California Public Records Act. The enrollment data
includes information on individual and household identifiers, plan selection, rating area,
age, income as a percentage of the FPL, gross premium, and post-subsidy premium. I use
the CMS public user files2 and the HIX Compare Data3 to recover the plan options at
3-digit ZIP code level4. I use the 2017-2018 American Community Survey (ACS) (Ruggles
et al., 1995) to supplement data for households who choose not to enroll through Covered
California (hereafter, the outside option). I exclude any households enrolled in or eligible
for another source of coverage, such as Medicaid and employer-sponsored insurance from
2CMS marketplace products available at: https://www.cms.gov/CCIIO/Resources/Data-Resources/
sbm-puf. Last access on April 22, 2021.
3Available at: https://hixcompare.org/. Last access on April 22, 2021.
4Fang and Ko (2018) report partial rating area and partial-county plan offering common in the all
exchange marketplaces. In California, 114 out of 204 plans offered in plan year 2017 are partially offered in
some counties. The precision of plan options at the 3-digit ZIP code level is important for validating the
SLCSP plan and inferring the amount of premium subsidy for enrolled households.
57
the ACS sample, and combine with Covered California enrollment data to form the universe
of all households who shop for individual health insurance on Covered California. I collapse
enrollment data at the household level. The analysis data consist of about 2 million house-
holds enrolled in Covered California, and 1.4 million eligible households simulated from the
ACS data who chose not to enroll on the exchange.
Table 21 reports the summary statistics of potential buyers in Covered California. Enrolled
households differ from households who chose the outside option in income and household
size. The enrolled households appear to have a lower income, entailing a greater share
eligible for the premium subsidy and the CSR subsidy. The share of outside option is
noticeably higher among young adults and families.
Variation in plan choice sets is considerable. In California, the number of available plans
ranges from 4 to 36. Premiums also vary substantially, even within a metal tier. The pre-
subsidy silver premium for a 21-year-old single adult ranges from $104/month to $268/month.
Medical Spending. I obtain proprietary claim-level administrative data from a national
insurer who participated in the ACA exchange marketplace in 14 states. From 2014 to 2017,
the insurer operated in all 19 rating areas in California, and stably accounted for more than
20 percent of the Covered California enrollment. The cost data include individual and
household identifiers; demographics information: 5-digit ZIP code, age, gender; and claims:
diagnosis code, CPT code, allowed claim amount, HCI service type, CMS specialty code,
and place code. I also observe information on enrolled metal tier, CSR variation, enrollment
duration, and premium subsidy amount.
Privacy regulation prohibits any possible crosswalk between the enrollment data and the
claims data. In fact, the claims data do not reveal the Health Insurance Oversight System
(HIOS) identifier of the enrolled plan. More importantly, I do not observe the rating areas
that enrollees live in. I recover each enrollee’s rating areas using their 5-digit ZIP code,
enrolled plan network, and pre-subsidy premium.
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I use the claims data to estimate claim costs to the insurer and the CSR subsidy costs that
were shifted from the government. Also, I follow the HHS-HCC risk adjustment model in
Pope et al. (2014) and compute each enrollee’s risk score (Appendix A.1). Lastly, I augment
the costs data using the CMS annual rate review data5, which contains plan-level average
costs for all plans sold on Covered California. Table 11 summarizes the medical consumption
and the Covered California enrollees’ risk scores that I observed in the proprietary claims
data.
Table 11: Summary Statistics of Claims Data
PMPM Allowed Amount Adjusted HHS-HCC Risk Score
Metal tier Mean SD 25pt 50pt 75pt 99pt Mean SD 25pt 50pt 75pt 99pt
Bronze 201 2503 0 0 45 3269 0.44 1.14 0.17 0.34 0.43 3.59
Silver 421 2920 0 40 165 7482 0.67 1.89 0.17 0.37 0.53 8.05
73% Silver 467 2964 0 37 170 8092 0.75 1.92 0.31 0.37 0.58 8.32
87% Silver 488 3390 0 43 196 7830 0.74 1.96 0.26 0.37 0.56 8.23
94% Silver 565 4690 0 47 224 8844 0.75 2.08 0.26 0.37 0.56 8.34
Gold 844 3869 1 67 302 17392 0.87 2.34 0.17 0.37 0.59 10.81
Platinum 1955 6709 18 165 824 26950 1.72 4.25 0.25 0.43 1.18 24.00
Notes: This table summarizes the risk profile of enrollees from the proprietary claims data. The risks are
summarized by metal tier average and measured by (1) per-member-per-month (PMPM) allowed amount
and (2) the Adjusted HHS-HCC risk score. Construction of the HHS-HCC risk score is documented in
Appendix A.1.
3.5. Method
I develop a model of the market for California exchange plans that focuses on the joint dis-
tribution of household-level health risk and preference for premiums and coverage. Because
CSRs increase insurers’ silver plan cost-sharing non-linearly with respect to households’ in-
come levels, the equilibrium premiums depend on (1) the enrollment mix by CSR-relevant
income groups, and (2) the level and slope of average claims of those income groups. With
heterogeneous preference of premiums and coverage, tracking individual household’s cov-
erage choice and its marginal effect on insurers’ costs is the key to examining the CSR
financing question. Previous studies of the California exchange market (Saltzman, 2018;
Tebaldi, 2019; Drake, 2018) share a common data limitation on household-level medical
5Available at: https://www.cms.gov/CCIIO/Resources/Data-Resources/ratereview.
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costs. I overcame this challenge by obtaining claim-level administrative data from a major
insurer that provides coverage to about 20% of California exchange enrollment. This novel
dataset allows me to predict household-level medical spending and use the prediction to
estimate the demand for coverage and costs to insurers. Specifically, I compute households’
and insurers’ cost-sharing responsibility of each plan, before and after the CSR de-funding.
I then let the predicted household medical spending directly enter the demand model as
part of coverage preference. Besides better capturing adverse selection, a major advantage
of such modeling is that it allows me to calculate an insurer’s marginal costs of covering
an additional household. More importantly, it allows me to directly compute the level and
slope of each plan’s average costs at any given set of premiums.
3.5.1. Demand
I estimate a nested logit choice model for insurance demand. Insurance decisions are made
at the household level, particularly because both premium subsidy and CSR subsidy sched-
ule are based on household income and household composition6. Households choose between
Covered California plans and an outside option of uninsurance based on each option’s rel-
ative price and coverage. Each household h is characterized by observable demographics
Zht = {zht, dht, aht, yht}: z is the rating region the household resides in; d is the household’s
gender composition and number of dependents; a is the household total age factor7; and y
is the household income as a percentage of the FPL.
Household h has an indirect utility function such that plan j in year t generates mean utility
uhjt = −αphp̃chjt − α
AV
h (Cht)AVhj + νj + ψhjt + ξjt. (3.13)
Household utility depends on average monthly premium per household member p̃chjt, pref-
6Previous work on ACA plan choices such as Saltzman (2019), Drake (2019), Tebaldi (2019) all treat
households as the unit for insurance decision making. Empirically, more than 98% of households observed
on the Covered California purchased enrolled in the same plan at a single purchase.
7Covered California adopted the federal age curve for age-based premium adjustment. Following the age
curve change in 2018, the age factors for enrollees younger than 21 years old increased exogenously, affecting
about 10% of enrolled households and potential buyers. See Footnote ?? for more details.
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erence of coverage, approximated by a plan’s actuarial value (AVhj), the mean utility of
plan’s non-financial features νj , choice friction ψhjt, and plan’s unobserved characteristics
ξjt.
Premium. Premiums for the households depend on household composition, household
income, and household residence.
p̃chjt = max
{




, j 6= 0 (3.14)
By the ACA premium subsidy schedule, the total premium a household pays for plan j is
the baseline premium p̃jt (after CSR loading) adjusted by the sum of household members’
age multiplier rt(aht) net the household subsidy. The subsidy amount is the gap between
age multiplier adjusted second-lowest-cost-silver-plan (SLCSP) rhtp̃sht and the household’s
maximum contribution cap(yht). Because many plans are offered to partial county, even
within a rating area, the SLCSP premium p̃s
ht
varies by county and by ZIP code. The
contribution cap as a proportion of household income increases linearly in income level for
households that earn between 100% and 400% FPL. To address preference heterogeneity
common in the health insurance market (Geruso, 2017) and to closely track substitution
patterns for the three CSR eligible income groups, I allow the marginal utility of premium
−αph to vary by household income and households’ average age bracket to track how the
plan-level loading needs respond to silver premium pricing, that is ∂δ∂ps . In practice, I let








. Specifically, αpyh varies across five income groups: income under
150% FPL, income between 150% and 200% FPL, income between 200% and 250% FPL,
income between 250%, and 400% FPL and income above 400% FPL. The first three income
groups correspond to households that are eligible for the three levels of CSR subsidies, and
are also eligible for premium subsidies. The fourth income group (250% and 400% FPL)
corresponds to households only eligible for premium subsidies. The last income group is
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households eligible for neither subsidies. The age-specific premium preference αpah varies
by five age groups8. The household composition component αpdh allows single-member
households to have a different premium preference from families.
Coverage. Preference for plan coverage depends on households’ demographics in two
aspects. First, the actuarial values of silver plans boost up to 73%, 87%, or 94% for CSR
eligible households, depending on the households’ income as a percentage of the FPL. Thus,
I use the CSR eligibility adjusted actuarial value, AVhj , in calculating the indirect utility.
Second, households of higher health risk, Cht, may place a greater value on plan coverage
(adverse selection). Moreover, conditioning on health risk, household income levels may
govern coverage preference. To capture both adverse selection and preference heterogeneity,
I let αAVh = α
AV + αAVyh × (C
pctl
ht − 1), where α
AV
yh varies by the same five income groups as
defined in premium preference. The interaction with per-person health risk percentile Cpctlht
(measured within a region) captures adverse selection: conditioning on income group, high-
risk households gain higher utility from generous coverage. I will dedicate Section 3.5.2 for
the modeling household’s expected medical spending Cht. In short, the projected medical
spending depends on observable household characteristics. Because I extrapolate medical
spending parameters from a single insurer’s claims data, I let the medical spending enter
the utility function via its first moment instead of its distribution. By this, I trace risk
selection yet abstract away from the assumption that households are fully informed about
the current distribution of their medical consumption.
Non-financial Characteristics. Within a metal tier, plans differ in other dimensions
such as brand and network. Preference of those non-financial features is captured by νj .
The last observed component is monetized choice friction ψhjt. I allow choice friction at the





8I let the age-specific premium preference to differ for households with average age younger than 21-
year-old, between 21 and 30 years old, between 31 and 40 years old, between 41 and 50 years old, and older
than 51.
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Outside Option. The utility uh0t of the outside option of uninsurance equals
uh0t = −αphρh + ν0(Zht), (3.15)
where ρ is the mandate penalty, and ν0 is the utility of uninsurance. A similar specifica-
tion is also used in Jaffe and Shepard (2020) and Polyakova and Ryan (2019) to captures
the difference in the average level of utility that consumers get from (not) purchasing any
insurance plan. Because the income-specific marginal utility is the key to capture the
substitution patterns for the CSR eligible households, I allow ν0 to vary by the same five in-
come groups as previously defined. Besides, I let single-member households have a different
mean utility of the outside option to capture their potential lower disutility of uninsurance.
Overall, letting ν0 vary by household demographics allows me to better match with the
observed substitution pattern, especially the elasticity of insurance demand with respect to
post-subsidy plan premiums.
I cluster choice alternatives by two nests k: (1) a nest containing only the outside option,
and (2) a nest containing all exchange plans. This two-nest structure addresses the potential
concern that a logit model might overestimate substitution to the outside option because
of its proportional substitution assumption.
I assume random utility with additive and separable choice noise. Specially, I assume that
the utility vhjt = uhjt+ εhjt, where εhjt follows a Type-I extreme distribution with variance
σr that varies by rating region. Households make choices dht from choice set Jht such that




I assume medical incidences arrive in a Poisson process with rate λit(r) for member i in
household h that lives in region r. In practice, I model and estimate cost parameters region
by region, thus for simplicity, I suppress r in the subscription. Suppose the lth incidence
incurs costs Ll, and {Llit} constitutes an i.i.d. sequence of random variable generated from
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a exponential distribution with parameter θit






Nit ∼ Poisson (λit) , λit = exp(Zitγn),
Lit ∼ Exp(θit), θit = exp(Zitγl).
Both frequency and severity are functions of individual characteristics Zit. The total med-
ical expenditure c̃it is the convolution between the incidence frequency and severity. By
assumption that {Lli} is i.i.d.,
Cit = E(c̃it) = E(Nit)E(Lit) = λit/θit. (3.17)
The projected medical spending Cht for household h is
∑
i∈hCit. The per-person risk




Essentially, I model the medical spending as a compound Poisson process. This decision
is for the following reasons. First and foremost, it aligns with the actuarial pricing model
(Klugman et al., 2008; Cerchiara and Magatti, 2014). The Poisson distribution of frequency
Nit ensures probability mass for $0 spending. Compared with other truncated models, the
compound Poisson requires less parametrization and is less computationally intense. Sec-
ond, the compound Poisson has the desired additive property that entails a simple closed-
form first moment E(c̃it), as well as the aggregation of the expectation of medical spending
within a household. The closed-form first moment significantly reduces the computation
burden in the choice model estimation. Moreover, it provides a simple yet actuarially con-
sistent way to compute equilibrium premium prices.
9Both the exponential and Weibull distribution generates a better fit than log-normal distribution in
model fitting. In choice-model validation within the insurer that provided the proprietary claims data,
the exponential and Weibull model produces similar choice predictions. Yet, the exponential distribution
requires one fewer parameter in modeling. I thus use exponential distribution as the preferred model.
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3.5.3. Expected Costs to Insurer
Insurers’ costs to cover household h under plan j consists of two parts: claims costs based




Cht −OOPhjt h is not CSR eligible
Cht −OOPhjt h is CSR eligible & j 6= silver
Cht −OOPht,70% Silver + 1
load
Ccsrht h is CSR eligible & j = silver
.
The OOP(·) denotes households’ projected out-of-pocket (OOP) medical spending. It is a
function of households’ total medical expenditure projection Cht, the plan’s coverage matrix
Xj , and household demographics Zht such as the number of dependents
10. Here I focus on
three key benefit attributes: deductibles, coinsurance, and maximum OOP limit. As a
stylistic demonstration, OOPhjt is a step-wise function of the household-level aggregate
expected total medical expenditures Cht:
OOPhjt =

Cht Cht < Deductiblehj
Deductiblehj + Coin.hj × (Cht −Deductiblehj) Cht ∈ [Deductiblehj ,OOP maxhj ]
OOP maxhj Cht > OOP maxhj
.
Because Covered California plans are standardized, a plan’s metal tier m(j) fully captures
the above three attributes of each plan. However, because the silver plan coverage varies
depending on a household’s CSR eligibility, the benefit attributes are household-specific. In
practice, triggers of family deductible and family out-of-pocket maximum require conditions
on both individual members’ spending as well as the household’s total spending. I follow
the exact individual and family deductible rules in calculating households’ expected OOPs.
10Conditioning on the same medical expenditure per household member, larger families will have lower
OOPs per member under the same coverage
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The CSR benefit costs Ccsrht only incurred after 2018 when the insurers started to bear CSR
costs. They are the differences between the accumulative amount a CSR household would
have paid in a standard silver plan and what the household actually pays with CSRs. Define
Ccsrht = OOPht,70% Silver −OOPht,CSR Silver. (3.18)
where OOPht,CSR Silver denotes a household’s expected out-of-pocket medical spending un-
der the CSR corresponding actuarial values, and OOPht,70% Silver denotes its out-of-pocket
medical spending under a standard silver plan (70% AV)11.
3.5.4. Equilibrium and Counterfactuals
Revenue Source. In an environment without risk-adjustment, the net revenue from an
household h under plan j is p̃hjt −Chjt. With risk-adjustment, the literature assumes that
the risk adjustment will (almost) fully capture each plan’s risk selection. Thus risk selection
(beyond what’s accounted by age and geographic risk factors) based on hidden sickness is
irrelevant (Handel et al., 2019; Tebaldi, 2019; Jaffe and Shepard, 2020; Polyakova and Ryan,
2019). Another common approach is to estimate an adjustment factor for the premiums pjt,
or an adjustment factor for the costs Chjt, such that after adjustment, the premium minus
cost reflects the post risk adjustment profit from selling plan j to household h. Because I
predict claims costs for individual household, I directly compute risk-adjustment transfer τ
received for covering household h as the difference between the insurer’s predicted average
claims and C̄f , and the predicted average claims weighted across all firms C̄:
τht = nht × (C̄f (pt)− C̄(pt)). (3.19)
11The realized CSR costs to the insurers require modeling of utilization frequency by service type, e.g.,
primary care physician visit, specialist visit, test, imaging, etc. For low utilization services such as advanced
imaging, the claims data are short in power to model them on the full set of individual characteristics.
Conversations with actuaries confirm that the current model that treats CSR costs as a proportion of the
average silver plan costs is generally consistent with actuarial pricing, especially how the actuaries adjusted
the 2018 silver premiums prices for loading. In Section ??, where I similarly model the CSR costs, the
predicted silver premium increases are consistent with the 2018 premium data. The current model thus
should suffice to capture the CSR costs shifted to the insurers.
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Equation 3.19 is derived based on the risk-adjustment payment calculation from Pope et al.
(2014) and Kautter et al. (2014), and is extensively discussed in Saltzman (2021). The net
profit from for household under plan j is:
p̃hjt − Chjt + τh(pt). (3.20)
Risk corridors expired in 2016, a year before the studied period. Thus it does not enter the
profit function.
Premium Pricing. Formally, in a given region r, the insurer offers one product in each
metal tier. The insurer sets a post-loading price vector p̃ = 〈pb, p̃s, pg, pp〉 to maximize total










Prhjt(p̃hjt − Chjt + τht(p̃t)).
where ∼ on price vector denotes the post-loading premiums as defined in Equation (??),
and superscript c denotes post premium subsidy. The Nash-in-price equilibrium is defined
by the first-order condition dΠ/dp̃ = 0, given all prices set by other insurers. I numerically
solve the optimal p̃∗ in equilibrium under the ACA medical loss ratio (MLR) constraint12.
In the simulation exercise, I first simulate the status quo: equilibrium conditions where
insurers’ participation is the same as in 2017 (before the CSR cost shocks) and the CSR is
financed under the federal budget. Then I consider two counterfacual scenarios:
Silver Loading, where insurers cover the CSR costs by only increasing the silver premi-
ums. Although Covered California also directed insurers to offer non-mirroring plans off the
12The MLR regulation stipulates that insurers in the ACA market spend at least 80 percent of their
revenue on healthcare claims and quality improvement, constraining the markups to be at most 25 percent
and requiring insurers to rebate extra revenue consumers. Although I cannot observe insurer’s spending on
quality improvement, which needs to be added to the claim spending, Cicala et al. (2019) suggests that this
type of spending is very small. I implicitly impose the 80% MLR constraint on the first-order condition.
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exchange such that unsubsidized households can purchase plans with unloaded premiums,
it is beyond this paper’s scope and data availability to model the off-exchange market. I
focus on the on-exchange market and assume the unsubsidized households do not have the
off-exchange options13.
Global Loading, where insurers cover the CSR costs by assuming those costs are shared
equally among enrollees of all metal tier products. The rationale behind this is that, be-
cause households will respond to premium changes by changing coverage levels, the CSR-
associated risks should be assumed upon all plans. The costs should be spread evenly by
all enrollees.
I calculate the per-capita premium subsidy, total number of premium subsidy recipients,
total premium subsidy payments in the status quo, and each counterfactual scenario. Espe-
cially, I will decompose the post-shock premium subsidy spending into three parts: payment
to recover the cost shocks, inefficiency due to adverse selection and market power (pass-
through minus 1), and improved insurance take-up. The last two parts involve trade-offs in
social welfare, which I will leave the discussion until Chapter 4.
In the static model, I do not allow insurers to exit the market despite potential negative
profits. This setting means to show how CSR costs are transferred to insurers and discour-
age their incentive to participate in the California exchange market. Instead of modeling
insurers’ exit decisions as dynamic equilibrium outcomes, I take those decisions from 2018
data as given and simulate the equilibrium premiums under the 2018 market participation.
Due to the price-linked premium subsidy design, the equilibriums are not unique and de-
pend on the issuer of the SLCSP in each market. Thus, I report the simulation results that
render insurers the least loss or least positive profits.
Remark. Because the CSR cost shocks incur to the silver plans whose premiums tie to
13Although I do not model the off-exchange market, I am currently working on an extension case where
each silver plan has separate baseline premiums for the CSR eligible and ineligible households. This scenario
is known to policymakers as the “Silver Loading Switcheroo,” and is used by 30 state-run exchanges in 2018
(Anderson et al., 2019).
68
the premium subsidy, silver loading is a faithful execution of the price-linked premium
subsidy. By design, silver loading is likely to disrupt the premium ranking with respect to
coverage level ranking at the status quo. For instance, more generous plans no longer require
insurees to have higher willingness-to-pay. Such changes will likely cause large equilibrium
effects such that insurees switch across metal tiers or take-up insurance. Depending on the
switch-in and switch-out populations’ risk level, those unintended equilibrium effects can
still increase premiums of non-silver plans and increase silver premiums by more than the
cost shocks would suggest.
In comparison, global loading is the weakest application of the price-linked premium sub-
sidies. By spreading the cost shock evenly among all insurees, global loading generally
preserves the premium ranking with respect to coverage level ranking. Although it seems
to spill the cost shocks over to non-silver plans, it is likely to result in less unintended
equilibrium effects, hence less impact on premiums.
3.6. Results
3.6.1. Demand for Coverage under Silver Loading
Table 12 reports a summary of the demand estimates from the nested-logit specifica-
tion. Since I estimate the demand model region-by-region, I report the average coefficients
weighted by each rating areas’ total number of potential buyers. The significance level is
calculated using the mean coefficients and the combined asymptotic distributions of all re-
gions. Premiums sensitivity do not monotonically decrease in income. In fact, households in
the lowest income group (138%-150% FPL) are the least responsive to premiums, whereas
households with income of 150%-200% FPL are the most premium sensitive. Since I also
allow the marginal utility of premium to vary by the average household age, the distribu-
tion of age group within income group is also relevant in predicting households’ response to
premium changes.
A key interest of the demand model is how households’ metal tier choice response to premi-
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Net Premium ($100 monthly per person)
Premium, 138%-150% FPL −1.135∗∗∗ 0.081 −3.968 −0.115 0.124
Premium, 150%-200% FPL −1.340∗∗∗ 0.185 −4.190 −0.349 0.029
Premium, 200%-250% FPL −1.110∗∗∗ 0.223 −3.971 −0.183 0.017
Premium, 250%-400% FPL −1.127∗∗∗ 0.199 −3.968 −0.121 0.028
Premium, > 400 FPL −1.204∗∗∗ 0.187 −4.002 −0.115 0.035
Premium, family −0.012 0.130 −0.137 0.124 0.052
Premium, <21 year old 1.301∗∗∗ 0.285 −1.050 2.664 0.018
Premium, 21-30 year old 0.348∗∗ 0.164 −0.761 3.296 0.028
Premium, 31-40 year old 0.305∗ 0.157 −0.367 2.851 0.022
Premium, 41-50 year old 0.512∗∗∗ 0.185 −0.550 3.124 0.020
Premium, >51 year old 0.339∗ 0.193 −0.247 3.397 0.009
Expected consumer OOP ($100 monthly per person)
OOP, 138%-150% FPL <0.001 0.080 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001
OOP, 150%-200% FPL <0.001 0.184 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001
OOP, 200%-250% FPL <0.001 0.226 −0.013 <0.001 <0.001
OOP, 250%-400% FPL <0.001 0.183 −0.003 <0.001 <0.001
OOP, > 400 FPL <0.001 0.077 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001
Actuarial Value
AV 2.313∗∗∗ 0.481 0.196 7.984 1.454
AV×(risk percentile− 1), 138%-150% FPL 0.034 0.071 <0.001 0.050 0.002
AV×(risk percentile− 1), 150%-200% FPL 0.026 0.037 0.009 0.058 0.001
AV×(risk percentile− 1), 200%-250% FPL 0.007 0.079 <0.001 0.039 <0.001
AV×(risk percentile− 1), 250%-400% FPL 0.008 0.072 <0.001 0.026 <0.001
AV×(risk percentile− 1), > 400 FPL <0.001 0.080 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001
Network
HMO/HSP Reference
PPO 0.572∗∗∗ 0.102 −0.872 7.337 0.067
EPO 0.827∗∗∗ 0.085 −0.718 1.746 0.067
Insurer
Anthem Reference
Blue Shield 0.353∗∗∗ 0.101 −1.147 2.048 0.068
Kaiser 0.924∗∗∗ 0.101 −11.482 2.123 0.070
Oscar −1.212∗∗∗ 0.182 −1.361 −0.643 0.105
Molina 1.521∗∗∗ 0.125 0.739 7.281 0.077
CCHP −0.670 0.483 −0.672 −0.669 0.004
Health Net 0.914∗∗∗ 0.122 −0.517 2.583 0.102
Health Net Life −0.615∗∗∗ 0.211 −0.890 −0.045 0.012
Valley Health 0.868 0.546 0.868 0.868 <0.001
Sharp Health 1.408∗∗∗ 0.338 1.408 1.408 <0.001
LA Care 0.332∗ 0.183 −0.105 0.824 0.097
Western −0.181 0.234 −0.250 −0.075 0.007
Friction
Insurer friction 1.822 0.080 0.370 2.390 0.526
Plan friction 2.564 0.080 0.594 3.705 0.854
Nest parameter 0.752∗∗∗ 0.044 0.184 1 0.241
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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ums. In Table 13, I report the average own- and cross-tier premium elasticities of coverage.
For a one percent increase in the silver base premium (for a 21-year-old adult), enrollment
of the 94% CSR silver, 87% CSR silver, and 73% CSR silver decreases by 0.8, 2.4, and 3.3
percent, respectively. On the other hand, the enrollment of standard silver plan decreases
by 7.2 percent. Silver premium increases lead to a higher share of CSR silver enrollment.
At plan level, dCSR sharedps ranges from -0.3 to 0.3, with a enrollment weighted mean of 0.05.
Mimicking the silver loading, I show an exercise that simulates the partial equilibrium
enrollment resulting from an X% increase in all silver premiums. Figure 11a reports the
simulated enrollment share as all silver premium increases by 1 to 100 percent among
households eligible for premium subsidies. The simulation applies demand estimates to
the 2017 data and assumes all silver plans simultaneously increase premiums by the same
percentage. In this setting, the rank for silver premiums and the insurer of the SLCSP
remains unchanged. The dollar amount of the SLCSP premiums increase translates to the
post-subsidy premium reduction from a dollar to a dollar. However, because I simulate
premium increases by percentage, an 1 percent SLCSP premium increase does not fully
offset premium increases of more expensive plans. Figure 11a resembles the demand curves
of metal tier among the subsidized population as the simulation of silver premium increase
exogenously shifts the relative premium with respect to silver plans for the enrolled and the
relative price of coverage for the unenrolled.
At the extensive margin, insurance take-up increases substantially as silver premiums and
premium subsidies increase. For a 20 percent increase in silver premium, which in the
2017 setting is equivalent to an average of $51 monthly increase in premium subsidy for a
21-year-old single-member household, insurance take-up among the subsidized population
increase by 3 percentage points. The enrollment share of bronze plans is stable along
the horizontal axis. This is because the flow into bronze plans (from potential buyers) is
roughly the same as the flow from bronze plans (to silver and gold plans). Consistent with
the framework prediction, silver enrollment share decreases as silver premium increases.
71
Table 13: Cross-tier Elasticities
Panel (a): 138%-150% FPL, eligible for CSR 94% silver + premium subsidy
1% increase in % change in probability of choosing
base premium of Outside Bronze Silver Gold Platinum
Mandate penalty −0.3779 0.0353 0.0353 0.0352 0.0351
Bronze 0.2364 −3.0111 0.3268 0.3258 0.3253
Silver 2.3496 3.4797 −0.8628 3.4788 3.3891
Gold 0.0909 0.1536 0.1536 −5.0432 0.1462
Platinum 0.0893 0.1296 0.1296 0.1296 −5.8136
Panel (b): 150%-200% FPL, eligible for CSR 87% silver + premium subsidy
1% increase in % change in probability of choosing
base premium of Outside Bronze Silver Gold Platinum
Mandate penalty −0.4348 0.1086 0.1086 0.1086 0.1076
Bronze 0.6046 −4.1119 1.0054 1.0056 0.9921
Silver 2.4517 4.2168 −2.4495 4.2176 4.2126
Gold 0.2254 0.3557 0.3560 −7.3099 0.3691
Platinum 0.1170 0.1832 0.1834 0.1835 −8.8179
Panel (c): 200%-250% FPL, eligible for CSR 73% silver + premium subsidy
1% increase in % change in probability of choosing
base premium of Outside Bronze Silver Gold Platinum
Mandate penalty −0.2706 0.1470 0.1470 0.1470 0.1470
Bronze 0.6710 −2.6465 1.2738 1.2738 1.2738
Silver 0.9622 1.7128 −3.3456 1.7128 1.7128
Gold 0.3146 0.5776 0.5776 −5.3122 0.5776
Platinum 0.1888 0.3418 0.3418 0.3418 −6.8260
Panel (d): 250%-400% FPL, eligible for premium subsidy
1% increase in % change in probability of choosing
base premium of Outside Bronze Silver Gold Platinum
Mandate penalty −0.1904 0.2224 0.2224 0.2220 0.2218
Bronze 0.5095 −2.4045 1.0915 1.0923 1.0923
Silver 0.5577 1.0130 −3.4845 1.0141 1.0154
Gold 0.2539 0.5215 0.5215 −4.8203 0.5222
Platinum 0.1497 0.3086 0.3086 0.3086 −6.0680
Panel (f): >400% FPL
1% increase in % change in probability of choosing
base premium of Outside Bronze Silver Gold Platinum
Mandate penalty −0.1322 0.3186 0.3186 0.3186 0.3186
Bronze 0.3050 −2.4650 0.8489 0.8489 0.8489
Silver 0.2552 0.5310 −3.7153 0.5310 0.5310
Gold 0.1656 0.3804 0.3804 −4.6800 0.3804
Platinum 0.1068 0.2205 0.2205 0.2205 −6.0087
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Figure 11: Simulation of Enrollment with X% Increase in Silver Premiums
(a) Subsidized (≤ 400% FPL)
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(b) Unsubsidized (>400% FPL)
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Notes: Simulated enrollment share when raising all silver premium by X% and holding other premiums
constant. Panel (a) reports how the enrollment share of each metal tier changes, including CSR silver
variations, as silver premiums increase. Because the increase in silver premiums translates to an increase
in premium subsidies a dollar to a dollar, a 1% increase in silver premium (the unit of the horizontal axis)
is approximately a $3 increase in monthly premium subsidy for a 21-year-old single-member household.
Equivalently, it is a $3 decrease of the premiums relative to silver for the enrolled, and a $3 decrease in the
price of coverage for the potential buys. Panel (b) reports the change in enrollment share of the unsubsidized
population. Contrary to the subsidized population, a 1% increase in silver premiums translates to a $3
increase in the premiums relative to silver for the enrolled, but no change to the price of coverage for the
potential buyers.
Unsurprisingly, the share of CSR plan enrollment of all silver enrollment increases in silver
premiums, since subsidized but ineligible for CSR benefits households are more sensitive
to silver premium increases than CSR eligible households. In California, 75 percent of
silver enrollees are CSR beneficiaries in 2017; this number increased to 77 percent in 2018.
With a 20 percent market-wise increase of silver premiums, the share of CSR enrollment
increase by 1 percentage point. The higher CSR share of silver enrollment implies a lower
effective elasticity for the non-SLCSP silver plan. Enrollment in gold and platinum plans
increases as they become relatively cheaper compared to silver plans. With a 20 percent
silver premium increase, the share of gold enrollment increases from 6 percent to 10 percent.
The gold enrollment almost doubles even though more than half of the subsidized population
is eligible for the dominating 87% or 94% CSR silver plans.
In comparison, Figure 11b plots the simulated enrollment share among the unsubsidized
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households. With a 20 percent silver premium increase, silver enrollment is almost halved,
while other metal tiers’ enrollment only increases slightly. The probability of opting out of
the exchange also increases.
3.6.2. Cost Estimation and Validation
In the presence of adverse selection, coverage changes at both extensive and intensive suggest
risk resorting. Figure 12 plots the predicted partial equilibrium average risks (approximated
by PMPM allowed amount) for each metal tier following an X% silver premium increase.
The left panel focuses on the subsidized households. With a 20 percent simulated silver
premium increase, the average risk of bronze plans decreases by 6 percent from $540 to
$506. While the average risk of standard silver plans (70% AV) declines across the entire
horizontal axis, the decline of risk of the 73% and the 87% CSR silver fades out when silver
premium increase exceeds 40%; the slope is less negative for the 87% CSR silver. Because
the 94% CSR silver plans are most heavily subsidized and offer the most generous coverage,
they have inelastic demand, and the average risk curve is observably flat. The average risk
of gold plans plateaus and then decreases as silver premium increase exceeds 20 percent.
Platinum plans show a steady and steep decreasing trend as silver premium increases.
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Figure 12: Simulation of Risk Resorting with X% Increase in Silver Premiums
(a) Subsidized (≤ 400% FPL) (b) Unsubsidized (>400% FPL)
Notes: Simulated average per-member-per-month (PMPM) when raising all silver premium by X% and
holding other premiums constant. Panel (a) reports how the average risk of each metal tier changes, including
CSR silver variations, as silver premiums increase. Because the increase in silver premiums translates to an
increase in premium subsidies a dollar to a dollar, a 1% increase in silver premium (the unit of the horizontal
axis) is approximately a $3 increase in monthly premium subsidy for a 21-year-old single-member household.
Equivalently, it is a $3 decrease of the premiums relative to silver for the enrolled, and a $3 decrease in the
price of coverage for the potential buys. Panel (b) reports the change in average risk of the unsubsidized
population. Contrary to the subsidized population, a 1% increase in silver premiums translates to a $3
increase in the premiums relative to silver for the enrolled, but no change to the price of coverage for the
potential buyers.
The right panel shows the risk resorting among the unsubsidized households. The vertical
axis scale suggests that the unsubsidized population on average has lower risks than the
subsidized population. Even for platinum plans, the expected medical spending is about
$100 PMPM. The prediction may underestimate the average risk as the unsubsidized pop-
ulation only consists of less than 10% of total population in Covered California. Neither
the enrollment nor the claims data contains a larger sample for estimation of this group.
That said, each metal tier’s average risk is relatively stable, except for silver plans, where
the average risk steadily drops as enrollees substitute to other metal tiers.
Although the current model extrapolates cost prediction using a single insurer’s claims data,
I show in Table 14 that the demand and cost models jointly fit the data well. In columns (1)-
(2), I show that the demand model is flexible to produce an accurate prediction of coverage
choices. Column (3)-(5) compare the distribution of the predicted total risk measured by
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Table 14: Enrollment and Cost Prediction Validation
Enrollment Share PMPM Allowed Amount ($)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)





Potential Buyers 45.6% 44.9% - 250 204
Bronze 14.9% 16.2% 342 361 445
Silver 35.2% 31.1% 476 553 623
Standard Silver 8.9% 6.8% - 304 333
73% Silver 5.2% 4.4% - 570 638
87% Silver 13.7% 12.7% - 631 707
94% Silver 7.4% 7.2% - 698 754
Gold 2.6% 6.0% 634 616 496
Platinum 1.6% 1.9% 1146 1313 650
the PMPM allowed amount with that reported in the CCIIO data. In particular, I compare
the reported risks (column 3) with the prediction based on the observed coverage choices
(column 4) and the prediction based on the predicted coverage choices (column 5). Column
4 shows that the cost model predicts risks very close to the CCIIO data. In Figure 22, I
show that the model also performs well at predicting plan-level risks. Column 5 suggests
that when combining choice and cost prediction, the model tends to underpredict the risks
for gold and platinum plans and over-predict the risks for the 87% and 94% CSR silver
plans.
3.6.3. Equilibrium Premiums, Enrollment, and Subsidy Spending
Table 15 reports the equilibrium baseline listed premiums (for a 21-year-old single adult
household) and consumer-paid premiums under the three counterfactual scenarios. The
listed premium prices are averaged by metal tier and weighted by the market size of rating
regions.
Silver Loading. Under the silver loading (2017 market participation), silver premiums on
average increase by 5 percent, while premiums for bronze, gold, and platinum plans change
by 2 percent, -3 percent, and 4 percent, respectively. Importantly, although premiums
of the benchmark silvers (SLCSP) also increase by 5 percent, due to considerable varia-
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tion across markets, increased premium subsidies do not result in a non-positive change in
the consumer-paid silver premiums. On the other hand, the increased premium subsidies
attenuate the increases in consumer-paid premiums for other metal tiers (column 6).
Although the current model takes insurers’ participation as given and does not allow the
equilibrium premiums to depend on participation decisions, I take insurers’ departure from
the exchange as given and repeat the silver loading counterfactual under the 2018 market
participation (column 7-10)14. With fewer insurers in many rating rations, the 2018 silver
loading counterfactual shows a more significant increase in premiums, especially the silver
plans. In particular, the baseline silver premiums increase by 43 percent compared to the
status quo, and the baseline premiums for bronze, gold, and platinum change by 9 percent,
11 percent, and -2 percent, respectively. The SLCSP premiums in the 2018 silver loading
scenario only increase by an average of 36 percent. As a result, silver plans become less
affordable. On the other hand, a large increase in premium subsidies resulting in lower
consumer-paid premiums for gold and platinum plans.
Global Loading. Panel B of Table 15 reports the average equilibrium under global loading.
To isolate the effect due to CSR financing strategy, I simulate the global loading counter-
factual using the 2017 market participation. Silver premiums increase by only 2 percent.
Moreover, the SLCSP premiums increase by 22 percent, resulting in a 10 percent reduction
in the average consumer-paid silver premiums. While the listed bronze premiums increase
by 14 percent, the consumer paid bronze premiums decrease by 8 percent thanks to the
increased premium subsidies.
Although silver loading—the faithful execution of price-linked premium subsidy—seems to
isolate non-silver plans from the impact of cost shocks, it ends up with a stronger effect on
those plans. In comparison, global loading has less impact on the non-silver plans, despite
that it does not fully utilize the price-linked mechanism to protect consumers and has no
14In Chapter 4, I examine the exit incentives by comparing insurers’ profits under silver loading counter-
factual with 2017 and 2018 market participation.
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Table 15: Average Premium Changes in Alternative CSR Financing Scenarios
Panel A: Silver Loading
Status Quo Silver Loading, 2017 Silver Loading, 2018

















Bronze 268.4 218.5 276.5 3% 219.9 1% 292.1 9% 219.4 0%
Silver 311.2 228.7 326.5 5% 237.1 4% 446.1 43% 307.8 35%
Gold 492.4 420.4 478.5 -3% 400.4 -5% 544.2 11% 416.4 -1%
Platinum 591.1 526.8 613.9 4% 543.8 3% 578.0 -2% 455.7 -13%
SLCSP 211.4 222.8 5% 287.8 36%
Panel B: Global Loading
Status Quo Global Loading











Bronze 268.4 218.5 304.7 14% 201.1 -8%
Silver 311.2 228.7 318.0 2% 206.2 -10%
Gold 492.4 420.4 518.5 5% 422.7 1%
Platinum 591.1 526.8 588.4 0% 500.6 -5%
SLCSP 211.4 258.6 22%
Notes: The table reports the change in average listed and consumer-paid premium by metal tier. The listed
price reports the average baseline premium for a 21-year-old adult weighted by rating region market size.
The consumer-paid premium reports the average post-subsidy premium weighted by predicted enrollment
probability. The row of SLCSP report the average benchmark silver premium of each rating region weighted
by market size.
intention to restrain premium increases to silver plans. Equilibrium effects play a critical
role in explaining the unintended consequence of implementing a price-linked subsidy design.
Table 16 reports the premium subsidy spending under different premium loading. The first
two rows present the nominal value of cost shocks, with the second row indicating the ratio
of each value under the corresponding counterfactual over that at status quo. At status quo,
the cost shocks equal to the actual value of federal CSR payments. It is also the ex-ante
cost shocks that are evaluated based on claims costs. When CSRs are funded by premium
loading (columns 2-4), the nominal value of cost shocks equals the additional premium
subsidy payments relative to those at the status quo. In other words, it measures the ex-
ante equivalence of the ex-post cost burden implied by the extra premium subsidy spending
should cost shocks translate to subsidy payments a dollar to a dollar. Note that under
premium loading, the implied value of cost shocks is evaluated based on market-determined
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premium prices.
Table 16: Premium Subsidy Spending in Counterfactuals











Nominal value of 682m 344m 1,454m 795m
cost shocks (0.5) (2.1) (1.2)
N. subsidy recipients 0.763m 0.785m 0.793m 0.788m
(1.03) (1.04) (1.03)
Premium subsidy $261 $290 $404 $334
per capita per mo. (1.11) (1.55) (1.28)
(normalization w.r.t. status quo in parenthesis)
Under silver loading with no insurers leaving the California market, the nominal value of
cost shocks almost halves. Intuitively, the remaining part of cost shocks should be born by
insurers, consumers, or both. In Chapter 4, I show that insurers will bear most of the re-
maining cost burden, resulting in negative insurers’ total profits. Thus, the reduced normal
value of cost shock is mainly due to a transfer from government spending to insurers’ net
loss. Since such a market is unstable, I repeat the silver loading simulation using insurers’
reduced participation in 2018 (column 3)15. In this case, a $1 of cost shock translates to
a $2.1 of additional premium subsidy payments. The nominal value of cost shocks is more
than doubled due to 1) more subsidy-eligible consumers enroll on the exchange (row 3), and
2) the per capita premium subsidy payment increases (row 4). The latter contributes to
more than 90% of the premium subsidy payment increase. In comparison, column 4 reports
the simulation results under global loading. In this case, the number of subsidy recipients
increases by less amount, and premium subsidy per capita only increases by half of that
under silver loading.
15In Chapter 4, I show that insurers are able to make positive profits under this condition.
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Limitations The current model does not endogenize the insurers’ market participation.
Taking participation decisions as given, our results only justify those decisions ex-post. Nev-
ertheless, this approach does not allow insurers’ to exit even with negative profit, which in
return affects competition among the remaining insurers. In a dynamic game which allows
insurers to have a positive probability to exit the market for a single period, the insurers
make their participation as well as the following pricing decision based on their believes
of competitors’ participation and pricing. The natural next step is to develop the current
model following Aguirregabiria and Mira (2007) to incorporate exit decisions in the model.
However, the one-period modeling still overlooks long-term reasons that influences insurers’
participation. For example, an insurer may be willing to tolerate short-run loss in order to
secure and even seize a larger market share in anticipation that competitors will exit the
market in the following year. It is also likely that an insurer chooses not to exit in spite of
loss to avoid high entry cost should they leave the market and wish to return in the future.
Given the influx of insurers returning to the exchanges since 2019, it is necessary to have a
multi-period dynamic model to fully rationalize insurers’ strategy. Future development of
this study will address the modeling and estimation concerns.
3.7. Conclusion
This chapter proposes a theoretical model to illustrate the cost-to-subsidy pass-through of
the price-linked subsidy design. When a market offers vertically differentiated products and
intensive adverse selection are presented, the model suggests the pass-through is unbounded,
and the direction and magnitude depends on the level of market competition and adverse
selection. The pass-through is theoretically possible to be greater than 1, meaning the
subsidy spending can be more than what is needed to directly pay off the supply side cost
shocks.
I then use the cost shocks introduced by the Cost-Sharing Reduction (CSR) subsidy de-
funding to quantify the pass-through on the exchange market. The analysis encapsulates
how the price-linked subsidy affects demand, insurer participation, and government’s sub-
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sidy spending at equilibrium. I estimate a model of plans on the Californian exchange and
simulate the market under alternative CSR financing strategies. When setting premium
prices, insurers account for risk selection of households into different coverage levels and the
equilibrium effects by marginal households’ response to premium changes.
Simulation exercises suggest that CSR defunding will discourage insurers from participating
in the exchange. With fewer insurers and plan options, silver premiums increase by 43%
if insurers are only allowed to raise silver premiums to cover CSR costs. This results in a
substantial increase in public spending. With the per-capita premium subsidies increased
by $82 per month, and enrollment increased by $34 thousand, the government spends $1.5
billion more in subsidizing the California exchange. The pass-through from cost shocks
to subsidy payments is 2.1. Alternatively, allowing insurers to raise premiums of all plans
to cover CSR costs is less disturbing to the market: insurers are able to maintain current
market participation, premiums increase by a lesser extent, and the pass-through is only
about 1.2.
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CHAPTER 4 : Cost-Sharing Reduction Subsidy: Who Benefits and How It Should
be Financed
4.1. Overview
The Affordable Care Act (ACA) Cost-sharing Reduction (CSR) subsidy is an important
program on the individual health exchange markets (the exchanges) that provides extra
coverage to low-income households. The ACA requires CSR provision on a specific type of
exchange plans1 (see Section 3.3 for details), and the federal government paid the costs since
the enactment of the ACA . In October 2017, however, the Trump administration terminated
the CSR payment2, leaving exchanges at the state level to respond independently. Many
insurers experienced an increase in costs and, in turn, raised premiums. However, due to
the price-linked premium subsidy design, one of many unintended effects was greater total
public spending of subsidizing the exchanges. Understanding the consequences of CSR
defunding and its broader implications on how to finance CSRs, in general, are thus public
finance questions in the context of the individual health insurance market.
The key to examining CSR de-funding is insurers’ response, including premium pricing
and market participation. In about 45 states, insurers raised silver premiums to fund the
CSRs, a solution known as “silver loading.”3 The rationale behind this is that, because
premium subsidies are linked to the benchmark silver plan (SLCSP) premiums, increasing
silver premiums all together will simultaneously increases the level of premium subsidies.
Consumer-paid premiums thus shall be little affected among the subsidized. While several
studies report substantial premium increases and enrollment decision changes in 2018 (An-
1Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Sec. 1402.
2CSR payment policy memo: https://www.hhs.gov/sites/default/files/csr-payment-memo.pdf.
3The silver loading mechanism is further split into two types. The first type is the standard silver loading,
in which the baseline silver premiums are the same regardless of households’ eligibility of premium subsidies
or CSR subsidies. About 15 states follow this type to silver loading. The other type of silver loading limits
the loads only to the subsidized households, thus the unsubsidized households are not directly affected by
the loading. This is known as “silver loading switcheroo”; it is reported that 30 states used this approach
in 2018. In California, although the state does not allow premiums to differ between the subsidized and
unsubsidized population, the state lets the insurers offer unloaded silver plans off the exchange. Thus the
unsubsidized households are not affected by the loading if they purchase coverage off-exchange. For more
details see Anderson et al. (2019) and a summary spreadsheet here.
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derson et al., 2019; Drake and Anderson, 2020; Rasmussen et al., 2019), those outcomes are
not separable from insurers’ diminished participation. In California, for example, Anthem
left 16 markets in 2018 and narrowed its offering to plans in more restrictive networks in
the remaining three markets. However, we know little about how such “silver loading”
governs insurers’ premium pricing. Nor do we know how the premium increases and mar-
ket participation affect consumers. In addition, demand and cost estimation in Chapter
3 suggests that marginal consumers are responsive to changes in relative premiums, and
movement by those consumers has equilibrium effects on premiums. Using a demand-based
graphic framework (Einav et al., 2010; Geruso et al., 2019), I show that those equilibrium
effects also matter in welfare calculation. Winners and losers are at both the extensive and
intensive margin. The net welfare effect is ambiguous, depending on the joint distribution
of risk and price sensitivity.
This chapter investigates alternative CSR financing strategies from a social planner’s per-
spective. I apply the models and estimations from Chapter 3 and compare social welfare
and return on public spending under four CSR financing scenarios: federal funding as the
status quo, silver loading, global loading, where insurers raise premiums of all metal tiers to
cover the CSR costs4, and a scenario where the CSRs are removed from the exchange. The
welfare measures I focus on are consumer surplus, insurer profits, and government spend-
ing. While the consumer surplus and insurer profits are measured following the conventional
practice, I include the avoided uncompensated care in government spending to incorporate
the pecuniary social benefit of providing subsidies. Although other externality of subsidies
such as utilities derived from letting other individuals have improved insurance coverage
(Pauly, 1968) are not explicated in the current model, its welfare and policy implication are
discussed.
The remainder of this chapter is organized as the follows. Section 4.2 reviews the existing
4Global loading means insurers increase premiums for all on-exchange plans, including non-silver plans,
to fund the CSRs. This approach assumes the CSR-related risks will transfer to other plans as households
change coverage level, thus CSR-related risks should not be limited to silver plans. A small number of states
(e.g. Indiana, Mississippi) use the global loading approach.
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literature. In Section 4.3 I describe the framework which suggests the welfare ambiguity
of Silver loading, or equivalently the full execution of the price-linked subsidies. In Section
4.4- Section 4.5 I present descriptive evidence and methods of welfare analysis. Lastly, I
report results in Section 4.6 and conclude.
4.2. Literature Review
This paper contributes to the broad literature of health insurance and public finance by
focusing on the design of the CSR and its role in the exchanges. Regardless of how insurers
respond, as long as the ACA requires the CSR provision, and the premium subsidies are
linked to the premium of a targeted plan, the federal government will continue to pay for
CSR subsidies, only now indirectly via premium subsidies. Moreover, because the premium
subsidy targets a much larger consumer body than the CSRs, the federal government is
now effectively offering additional subsidies that equal the market-determined value of the
average CSRs to those who are not CSR eligible. The efficiency in CSR provision should
be discussed in three questions: (1) why the CSRs are needed, (2) how should the value of
CSRs be determined, and (3) how CSRs should be distributed.
By examining the first question, this paper adds to the realm of studies on health insurance
subsidy design. Besides providing consumers the protection against financial hardship from
catastrophic medical spending (Gruber, 2008), coverage expansion such as CSRs also aims
to improve the efficiency of coverage provision through a broader pooling, promoting a stable
and competitive insurance supply (Culter and Reber, 1998; Einav et al., 2010; Hackmann
et al., 2015). In line with Finkelstein et al. (2019b), I find that CSRs provide extra incentives
that prevent 5 percent of low-income and low-risk households from leaving the Californian
exchange. Removing CSRs will lead to premium increases ranging from 1 to 10 percent and
a consumer surplus reduction of $32 million. Moreover, government spending increases by
$54 million in the absence of the CSR provision, suggesting an important role of CSRs in
lowering the average risk level of the exchanges and reducing the program’s total costs.
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The second question—how should the value of CSRs be determined—relates to the literature
on the interplay between subsidy design and premium pricing. Since the de-funding, the
value of CSRs is determined by the level of silver premium increases. Yet, premium prices
are determined by insurers’ incentives and market competition. How to align them with the
public interest is a social planner’s problem. Previous studies have shown the misalignment
between insurers’ pricing incentives and subsidy program initiatives. Liu and Jin (2015)
find employer contribution in the Federal Employees Health Benefits Program contributes
to premium increases. Decarolis (2015) and Decarolis et al. (2020) find that Medicare Part
D insurers game for subsidies paid to low-income enrollees; such gaming behavior distorts
premiums and raises the program costs. Jaffe and Shepard (2020) find that price-linked
subsidies weaken competition and increase the government and consumers’ total spending.
In the context of CSRs, insurers are discouraged from participating in the exchange due
to increased costs. Those decisions, in return, affect premium pricing by the remaining
insurers. Although this paper does not focus on insurers’ pricing incentives, the results sug-
gest that valuing CSRs based on premium prices results in a lower return on public spending.
4.3. Framework
Silver loading increased the premium subsidy by 18 percent per Californian enrollee in 2018.
Greater premium subsidies increase willingness-to-pay (WTP) and hence the demand for
coverage. Frean et al. (2017) use data from ACS, and Sacks (2018) uses data from the
Current Population Survey (CPS) to find that premium subsidies significantly reduce the
uninsurance rate. With silver loading, Drake and Anderson (2020) find that the extreme
cases of $0 premium plans are associated with a 14 percent increase in enrollment among
low-income households. It is also reported that exchange enrollees became more likely to
change plans, especially across metal tiers in 2018 compared to earlier years (Rasmussen
et al., 2019). I apply the framework in Geruso et al. (2019), more fundamentally as in
Einav et al. (2010), to show the extensive and intensive enrollment changes. The framework
illustrates the impact of CSR de-funding similarly to that in Kolstad and Kowalski (2012),
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Kowalski (2014), and Panhans (2019). I will show graphically how those changes lead to
risk re-sorting in the presence of adverse selection and how they eventually cause social
welfare gains and losses that are theoretically ambiguous.
I focus on the subsidized exchange enrollees because they consist of about 90 percent of the
Covered California population (see Appendix A.3 for analysis of the unsubsidized popula-
tion). Figure 13b sets up the framework graphically. The horizontal axis indexes consumers’
WTP for insurance coverage, declining from left to right. The entire horizontal space rep-
resents the entire population who are eligible to purchase insurance on the exchange. The
solid brown line (WTPB) is the WTP for bronze coverage net the mandate penalty. The
WTP for uninsurance is normalized to $0 so that WTPB is also the demand curve for
bronze (DB).
At equilibrium, bronze premium (PB) intersects bronze’s average costs and demand. Con-
sumers to the right of the intersection remain uninsured, and those to the left of the intersec-
tion purchase insurance on the exchange. The downward sloping AC curve reflects adverse
selection (Einav et al., 2010). The solid teal line (WTPS) is WTP for silver coverage net
mandate penalty. Demand for the silver is the population with WTPS−WTPB ≥ PS−PB
(Keeler et al., 1998), represented by the dash teal line (DS). At equilibrium, the silver
premium (PS) and the marginal bronze buyer are determined by the intersection of sil-
ver average cost and silver demand. Panel (b) “zoom-out” Panel (a) to include the more
generous gold plan in the same framework.
Silver loading forces CSR subsidy costs on the insurers; the average cost for silver hence
shifts upward. In the meantime, silver loading boosts up the per-capita premium subsidies,
shifting WTP curves up for all plans. In the formal two-margin framework, the new market
equilibriums are determined by the dynamics between demand, marginal cost, and average
cost5. For the demonstration simplicity, I abstract away from describing the equilibrium
generating process. Given adverse selection, I use the marginal consumers’ movement be-
5For details see Geruso et al. (2019).
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Figure 13: Silver Loading Impact on Demand and Subsidized Enrollee Sorting: the Setting
(a) Silver vs. Bronze vs. Uninsurance (b) Gold vs. Silver vs. Bronze
Notes: The graphs show the initial equilibrium of uninsurance, bronze plan enrollment, silver plan enroll-
ment, and gold plan enrollment. Panel (a) shows the equilibrium of uninsurance, bronze, and silver. As the
lowest coverage level, WIP for bronze is the same as the demand curve for bronze. The intersection of bronze
AC and bronze demand determines bronze premium PB and the extensive margin type, which is indifferent
between a bronze plan and uninsurance. The silver demand curve DS starts at the extensive margin and
extends leftwards. Its intersection with silver AC determines the silver premium PS and the bronze enrollee
who is indifferent between a bronze and a silver plan. This marginal person determines the start of the gold
demand in Panel (b).
tween any high- and low-coverage pair after the silver loading to predict the direction of
AC curve shifting and present the final position of the AC curves in the new equilibriums.
Figure 14a shows the new equilibrium between bronze and uninsurance, where the new
(darker) WTPB intersects with the bronze’s new AC curve. Formally, the new AC curve
is determined by the newly insured’s marginal risk and those who switch from silver to
bronze. The bronze’s new equilibrium moves downward along its AC curve by the primary
effect of the healthier newly insured. The new equilibrium has a lower PB, which shifts
down the silver demand curve. Silver enrollees with lower WTP switch on the intensive
margin to lower coverage. “Zooming-out” to Figure 14b, a higher PS leads the marginal
silver enrollees to switch to gold. Because those switchers are healthier than the existing
gold enrollees, the gold plan’s average cost is lower in the new equilibrium. For the silver
plan, because the average health risk is positively affected by the silver-to-gold switchers
but negatively affected by the silver-to-bronze switchers, the net effect is ambiguous.
Figure 15 visualizes the welfare impact. The solid lines now represent WTPs net the cost
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Figure 14: Silver Loading Impact on Demand and Subsidized Enrollee Sorting
(a) Silver vs. Bronze vs. Uninsurance (b) Gold vs. Silver vs. Bronze
Notes: The graphs show the equilibrium changes due to silver loading. The key exogenous changes are
(1) the upward shift of silver AC due to the silver loading and (2) the upward shift of all WTP curves due
to increased premium subsidies. Movements of all the other curves are due to equilibrium effects. Panel
(a) shows the equilibrium effect of a lower extensive margin leads to a downward shift of the silver demand
curve; thus, more individuals switch from silver to bronze. Panel (b) shows the equilibrium effect passes on
to gold, where the gold demand shift upwards, and individuals on the left margin of the silver shift to gold.
See text body for details.
difference between the respective metal tier and the bronze plan. They also subtract the
increased WTP by higher premium subsidies since they are transfers from the government
to consumers. As a result, the solid lines in Figure 15 are interpreted as the societal WTP
for different coverage levels. The color blocks depict welfare gains (in green) and losses (in
red) due to silver loading. Figure 15a focus on the welfare impact on silver and bronze
enrollees. While some newly insured experience a welfare gain at the extensive margin, the
others cause an efficiency loss because their willingness-to-pay for coverage is lower than
the social costs to provide it. At the intensive margin, silver-to-bronze switchers experience
a welfare loss. Figure 15b includes another intensive margin welfare change—the gains by
silver enrollees who switch to the gold plan. Overall, this suggests that the net welfare
effects of silver loading are theoretically ambiguous.
I repeat the same welfare analysis among the unsubsidized enrollees in Appendix A.3.
Although the unsubsidized population experiences the same change in relative premiums
between any given pair of high- and low-coverage plans as the subsidized one, their WTP is
unaffected by the loading. Comparing Figure 15 (subsidized) and Figure 21 (unsubsidized),
the subsidized population appears to have more silver enrollees switchers.
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Figure 15: Welfare Impact on Subsidized Enrollees by Silver Loading
(a) Silver vs. Bronze vs. Uninsurance (b) Gold vs. Silver vs. Bronze
Notes: The graphs show social welfare impact of silver loading on the subsidized households. Panel (a)
shows the case that consumers switch on the extensive margin between uninsurance and bonze and the
intensive margin between bronze and silver. The solid lines are WTP net the difference in plan costs and
net increased premium subsidy. The welfare gain in consumer surplus is shaded in green. The welfare loss
by silver consumers who switch to bronze is shaded in red. Additional loss due to allocation inefficiency is
also shown in red. Panel (b) shows welfare impact on consumers who switch from silver to gold. See text
body for details.
4.4. Descriptive Evidence
Figure 16a plots the trend of the percentage change in average enrollment weighted premium
prices of each metal tiers. While the trends are almost parallel for bronze, gold, and platinum
plans between 2017 and 2018, silver premium increases peaked in 2018 at 25 percentage
points. Because of their links to premium subsidies, post-subsidy premiums drop. Since
only the out-of-pocket premium differences influence metal tier choices, Figure 16b shows the
trend of the level change in post-subsidy premiums of each metal tier. All metal tiers show a
dip below 0 in 2018, suggesting the average premium paid by enrollees decreased due to the
greater premium subsidies. The observation that the level change in net silver premiums is
slightly negative in 2018 indicates a reduction in unsubsidized silver enrollment, combined
with a downward shift in the income level of subsidized silver enrollment. Most noticeably,
thanks to the increased premium subsidy, the net premiums for gold and platinum plans
significantly dropped by about $70 (about a 20 percentage point drop) in 2018. The fact
that the dips for gold and platinum are deeper than that for bronze suggests more premium
subsidy beneficiaries switching to those generous plans. I describe the switching pattern in
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Table 17.
Figure 16: Change in Gross and Net Premium Prices
(a) Percentage change in pre-subsidy premiums (b) Level change in post-subsidy premiums
Notes: Panel (a) shows the trend of the percentage change in pre-subsidy premiums of the four main
metal tiers in Covered California. For each enrollee, the premiums are normalized to the baseline premium
(for a 21-year-old adult) such that the change is not affected by the age factors. The increase is weighted
by enrollment. Panel (b) shows the trend of changes in the post-subsidy premiums levels. Similarly, the
premiums are also normalized to the baseline and weighted by enrollment.
Metal switching from (to) silver substantially increased (decreased) between 2017 and 2018.
Individuals receiving premium subsidies (white rows) show increased shares that stay with
or move from silver to more generous plans such as gold and platinum. In particular,
about 4 percentage points more subsidized silver enrollees switch to gold plans. Retention
for gold and platinum plans increased by 10 percentage points and 7 percentage points,
respectively. Subsidized bronze enrollees also increased the share that switches to Gold. On
the contrary, unsubsidized enrollees show a weaker trend in staying or moving to generous
metal tiers. Instead of re-shopping for coverage, many left the exchange (column “outside
option”). Because the enrollment data do not trace enrollees’ insurance status and insurance
type before they came to the exchange, I cannot report the difference in extensive margin
change—whether there are more uninsured individuals in 2018 than in 2017. In the last two
rows (“outside option”), I report changes in metal tier choices by new exchange enrollees.
In 2018, bronze and gold plan became more attractive to the new enrollees, with subsidized
consumer favors gold plans while unsubsidized enrollees favor bronze plans.
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Table 17: Transition between Metal Tiers Significantly Change in 2018
t
t+ 1
subsidy B S G P Catas. O
Bronze
Y -1.8% -1.3% 2.8% 0.3% 0.0% 0.0%
N -0.3% -0.7% 0.2% 0.0% 0.0% 0.7%
Silver
Y 1.1% -5.8% 4.1% 0.6% 0.0% 0.0%
N 1.0% -5.6% 0.8% 0.0% 0.0% 3.8%
Gold
Y 0.9% -12.8% 10.1% 1.8% 0.0% 0.0%
N 1.2% -4.2% 0.5% 0.1% 0.1% 2.3%
Platinum
Y 0.2% -8.7% 1.1% 7.3% 0.0% 0.0%
N 0.5% -1.8% 1.7% -1.8% 0.1% 1.4%
Catastrophic
Y 8.5% -18.7% 9.2% 1.2% -0.1% 0.0%
N -0.9% -0.8% 0.2% -0.1% -0.5% 2.0%
Outside Option
Y 2.6% -15.5% 11.0% 1.8% 0.0%
N 10.1% -19.6% 7.8% 0.5% 1.2%
Notes: Denote metal tier switching by the share of individuals who enrolled in metal m in time t+ 1 con-
ditioning on his/her metal choice in time t: (mt+1|mt). Consumers makes enrollment decisions from five
coverage levels: b(ronze), s(silver), g(old), p(latinum), c(atastrophic), or n(not enroll). For a given m∗t ,
the switching pattern is described by a transition vector 〈bt+1, st+1, gt+1, pt+1, ct+1, nt+1|m∗t 〉; the vector
sums up to 100%. Stacking the transition vectors of all m∗t alternatives generates the transition matrix of
metal choices, with the rows indexing the metal choice in plan year t, and the columns indexing the metal
choice in plan year t + 1. Cell (b, s)t, for example, indicates the share of year t bronze enrollees who en-
roll in silver in year t + 1. I take the difference between the transition matrix for the 2017-2018 switch-
ing and that for 2016-2017 switching such that the new cell (b, s)∆ denotes the change in metal switching:
(b, s)∆ = (b, s)t=2017− (b, s)t=2016. The differenced transition matrix is presented in Table 17, with each cell
further grouped by enrollees’ premium subsidy status in year t+ 1. All differences are significant and have
t-statistics significant at a 1% level.
With the consumer changing coverage levels, the framework predicts a lower average risk
of bronze and gold plans after the silver loading. Figure 17 reports the average and total
allowed claims risk using the annual rate review data from the CCIIO. The empirical ob-
servations are consistent with the theoretical predictions. Overall, the average risk across
all metal tiers is slightly lower in 2018 ($65 lower per-member-per-month). For the total
enrollment, although there is no significant increase in the number of enrollees, the average
weeks that a household stays enrolled in the exchange increase from 38.6 weeks to 41.8
weeks.
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Figure 17: Change in the Average and Total Risks in 2018
(a) Change in PMPM allowed claims (b) Change in total allowed claims
Notes: Both figures are calculated using the CCIIO annual rate review data. All numbers are in 2018
dollars.
4.5. Structural Estimation and Counterfactuals
Structural estimations of demand and supply use the same models as described in the
previous chapter Section 3.5. In addition, the counterfactual exercise follows a similar
structure as in Chapter 3. Due to the policy focus, I add another counterfactual scenario
to examine how the CSR provision impacts consumers, insurers, and the public budget.
In summary, the counterfactual analysis examines the welfare impact of the following CSR
funding strategies, where welfare measurements will be elaborated in Section 4.5.1.
Silver Loading, where insurers cover the CSR costs by only increasing the silver premiums.
Global Loading, where insurers cover the CSR costs by assuming those costs are shared
equally among enrollees of all metal tier products.
No CSR Subsidies, where the government terminates the CSR subsidy provision, and
insurers set premium prices accordingly.
4.5.1. Welfare Calculation
I use the estimated model to compute social welfare before and after the silver loading is
token in place. Social welfare has three components: consumer surplus (CS), insurer profits
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(Π), and government subsidy spending (GS),
W = CS + Π−GS. (4.1)
Producer surplus Π is calculated following Equation (3.21), where risk adjustment is already
included as a part of revenue. Following in Small and Rosen (1981), the consumer surplus










Summing up all households in the sample yields the total consumer surplus.
Government subsidy spending consists of two parts: premium subsidy payment and CSR
benefit payment. For household h, the government pays premium subsidies equal max{mhp̃sh−
caph, 0}, where p̃sh is the post-loading, if applied, second-lowest-cost-silver-premium (Equa-
tion (3.14)). For enrolled household h, the government pays CSR benefit ccsrht in 2017, which




















Silver loading ( 1
load
= 1) saves government spending on CSRs. However, a higher p̃s
ht
in-
creases premium subsidy per individual enrollee and the total enrollment. The net change
in government spending is ambiguous.
The last piece of the welfare matrix is potential savings in public spending by insuring
households on the exchanges. I account for the fact that when a consumer enrolls in an
exchange plan, the government is likely to save on uncompensated care payments. Follow-
ing the Kaiser Family Foundation and Urban Institute 2013 report on public spending on
uncompensated care for the uninsured (Coughlin et al., 2014), I assume that the uninsured
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only pay 35 percent of their expected medical spending, leaving the rest to government un-
compensated care payments. Because the cost model predicts the ex-post expected medical
spending after households take-up insurance, I account for cost increases due to insurance
coverage (i.e., moral hazard) by dividing a cost factor φ = 0.25 based on the results from
the Oregon Health Insurance Experiment (Finkelstein et al., 2012, 2019a,b). Formally un-





The government outlay equals the spending on premium and CSR subsidies minus saving
on uncompensated care payments.
4.6. Results
4.6.1. Equilibrium Premiums and Coverage Choices
Table 18 added the simulated equilibrium premiums of the no CSR scenario to the results
from the previous chapter (Table Table 15). The listed premium prices are averaged by
metal tier and weighted by the market size of rating regions.
Silver Loading. Under the silver loading (2017 market participation), silver premiums on
average increase by 5 percent, while premiums for bronze, gold, and platinum plans change
by 2 percent, -3 percent, and 4 percent, respectively. Importantly, although premiums of
the benchmark silvers (SLCSP) also increase by 5 percent, due to considerable variation
across markets, increased premium subsidies do not result in a non-positive change in the
consumer-paid silver premiums. On the other hand, the increased premium subsidies at-
tenuate the increases in consumer-paid premiums for other metal tiers (column 6). At this
equilibrium, insurers incur a net loss of $333 million6.
The negative profit suggests insurers’ incentive to leave the exchanges. Although the current
6The negative profit is robust to simulations with various starting points, where I choose the starting
points by multiplying the premiums in status quo by [1.05, 1.1, . . . , 1.3].
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model takes insurers’ participation as given and does not allow the equilibrium premiums
to depend on participation decisions, I examine the exit incentives by comparing the sil-
ver loading counterfactual under the 2017 market participation (column 3-6) with a silver
loading counterfactual under the 2018 market participation (column 7-10). With fewer
insurers in many rating rations, the 2018 silver loading counterfactual shows a more sig-
nificant increase in premiums, especially the silver plans. In particular, the baseline silver
premiums increase by 43 percent compared to the status quo, and the baseline premiums
for bronze, gold, and platinum change by 9 percent, 11 percent, and -2 percent, respectively.
The SLCSP premiums in the 2018 silver loading scenario only increase by an average of
36 percent. As a result, silver plans become less affordable. On the other hand, a large
increase in premium subsidies resulting in lower consumer-paid premiums for gold and plat-
inum plans. More importantly, insurers earn positive profits (10 million), although only a
third of the status quo level. Comparison of the silver loading counterfactual with the 2017
and 2018 market participation suggests their profit-maximizing incentive can rationalize
insurers’ withdrawal.
In Figure 18a, I report the distribution of change in probability of choosing each metal tier.
The distribution of changes in coverage choice probability is wide and heterogeneous across
income levels (Table 19) due to different preferences of premiums and coverage. Under sil-
ver loading with 2017 market participation, the probability of choosing the outside option
increases by 0.2 percentage point. The probability mass above zero is mainly by unsubsi-
dized households. The probability of choosing a bronze plan increases by 0.3 percentage
points. Unsurprisingly, the probability of choosing a silver plan decreases by 2 percentage
points, and the reduction is more significant among the lower-income groups. The proba-
bility of choosing a gold plan and a platinum plan increases by 0.6 percentage points and 1
percentage point, respectively.
Global Loading. Instead of only raising silver premiums to cover the CSR costs, global
loading allows insurers to increase premiums of all metal tiers to address the CSR costs.
While premiums of non-silver plans also change under silver loading, the key difference is
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Table 18: Average Premium Changes in Alternative CSR Financing Scenarios
Panel A: Silver Loading
Status Quo Silver Loading, 2017 Silver Loading, 2018

















Bronze 268.4 218.5 276.5 3% 219.9 1% 292.1 9% 219.4 0%
Silver 311.2 228.7 326.5 5% 237.1 4% 446.1 43% 307.8 35%
Gold 492.4 420.4 478.5 -3% 400.4 -5% 544.2 11% 416.4 -1%
Platinum 591.1 526.8 613.9 4% 543.8 3% 578.0 -2% 455.7 -13%
SLCSP 211.4 222.8 5% 287.8 36%
Panel B: Other CSR financing scenarios
Status Quo Global Loading No CSR

















Bronze 268.4 218.5 304.7 14% 201.1 -8% 295.2 10% 233.1 7%
Silver 311.2 228.7 318.0 2% 206.2 -10% 308.7 -1% 216.0 -6%
Gold 492.4 420.4 518.5 5% 422.7 1% 515.6 5% 437.9 4%
Platinum 591.1 526.8 588.4 0% 500.6 -5% 596.0 1% 522.8 -1%
SLCSP 211.4 258.6 22% 230.8 9%
Notes: The table reports the change in average listed and consumer-paid premium by metal tier. The listed
price reports the average baseline premium for a 21-year-old adult weighted by rating region market size.
The consumer-paid premium reports the average post-subsidy premium weighted by predicted enrollment
probability. The row of SLCSP report the average benchmark silver premium of each rating region weighted
by market size.
that: under silver loading, the premium changes of other metal tiers are due to the equilib-
rium effect by silver enrollees who change coverage level; under global loading, premiums of
those metal tiers change because the insurers assume the CSR-associated risks are equally
shared and added to all enrollees.
Panel B of Table 18 reports the average equilibrium under global loading. To isolate the
effect due to CSR financing strategy, I simulate the global loading counterfactual using
the 2017 market participation. Silver premiums increase by only 2 percent. Moreover, the
SLCSP premiums increase by 22 percent, resulting in a 10 percent reduction in the average
consumer-paid silver premiums. While the listed bronze premiums increase by 14 percent,
the consumer paid bronze premiums decrease by 8 percent thanks to the increased premium
subsidies.
96
Table 19: Changes in Metal Tier Choice Probability under Alternative CSR Financing
Scenarios
Not enroll Bronze Silver Gold Platinum
Panel A: Silver Loading, 2017
138%-150% FPL -0.1 [3.7] 0.4 [4.7] -0.9 [12.3] -0.7 [6.4] 1.2 [6.9]
150%-200% FPL -0.2 [5.5] 0.8 [6.7] -3.2 [14.0] 1.1 [7.1] 1.5 [6.4]
200%-250% FPL -0.7 [4.7] -0.1 [8.1] -1.9 [9.0] 1.3 [6.9] 1.4 [9.8]
250%-400% FPL -0.6 [5.6] 0.4 [6.2] -1.4 [7.1] 1.0 [5.1] 0.6 [3.4]
>400% FPL 2.0 [8.4] -0.2 [7.4] -1.9 [4.9] -0.2 [4.1] 0.3 [3.1]
Panel B: Global Loading
138%-150% FPL -0.3 [2.5] 1.6 [6.6] -3.3 [8.6] -0.2 [5.8] 2.3 [7.1]
150%-200% FPL -0.5 [4.9] 1.9 [8.0] -2.4 [10.6] -0.7 [7.6] 1.8 [7.9]
200%-250% FPL 0.2 [4.7] 1.4 [9.7] -1.3 [7.9] -0.2 [7.6] -0.2 [9.4]
250%-400% FPL 1.6 [7.7] 0.6 [9.5] -1.9 [7.2] -0.3 [7.8] 0.1 [5.4]
>400% FPL 6.6 [9.9] 0.1 [8.9] -3.3 [5.3] -2.3 [5.2] -1.0 [3.5]
Panel C: No CSR
138%-150% FPL 4.4 [6.4] 7.9 [9.6] -23.0 [17.7] 3.7 [9.5] 7.1 [12.3]
150%-200% FPL 3.5 [6.9] 5.4 [9.8] -16.0 [15.3] 2.3 [11.3] 4.9 [10.7]
200%-250% FPL 1.0 [5.3] 0.2 [10.1] -1.9 [8.6] 0.5 [9.5] 0.2 [8.4]
250%-400% FPL 1.4 [7.0] -1.5 [9.0] -0.9 [8.2] 0.7 [8.9] 0.3 [4.7]
>400% FPL 3.9 [7.2] 1.1 [7.9] -1.5 [6.5] -0.5 [4.7] -0.8 [2.5]
Notes: The table reports the mean and standard deviation of changes in metal tier choice probability. For
each household, I calculate the probability of choosing each metal tier at status quo and that the under
the three counterfactual scenarios. The numbers without bracket present the mean change in probability of
choosing the metal tier indicated by the column. The numbers inside bracket present the standard deviation
of the changes in probability.
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Figure 18b shows the distribution of changes in metal tier choice probability under global
loading. The probability of choosing the outside option on average increases by 2 percentage
points. The probability of choosing a bronze plan or a silver plan decreases by a similar
magnitude as under silver loading (1 percentage point and -2.4 percentage points, respec-
tively). The probability of choosing a gold and platinum plan decreases by 1 percentage
point and increases by 0.4 percentage point, respectively.
No CSRs. Lastly, in the scenario where the CSR subsidies are completely removed, the
average premium increases show a different pattern. Bronze premiums have the largest av-
erage increase (10 percent), followed by gold premiums (5 percent) and platinum premiums
(1 percent). On average, silver premiums decrease by 1 percent, mainly due to a reduced
average risk as high-risk former CSR-eligible households switch to gold and platinum plans.
Low-income households are most affected by the potential CSR removal. As silver plans
become less attractive to eligible households, about 5 percent of the low-risk former CSR-
eligible households will leave the exchange. On the other hand, due to the reduction of
consumer-paid silver premiums, the overall choice probability of choosing the outside op-
tion increases by 3 percentage points. Risks of the staying CSR-eligible households will
still be borne by insurers, as they will switch to other metal tiers based on preferences of
premiums and coverage. In particular, the probability of choosing silver plans decreases
by 7 percentage points, and the probability of choosing non-silver plans increases by 1 to
2 percentage points. This substitution pattern contributes to premiums increases of non-
silver plans.
4.6.2. Welfare Comparison
Table 20 reports welfare consequences on consumer, insurer, and government spending under
different CSR financing strategies. At status quo (column 1), the government spends a total
of $3.1 billion on subsidies, including $2.4 billion on premium subsidies and $0.7 billion on
CSR benefits. Savings on the uncompensated care amount to $2.7 billion, resulting in a net
government outlay of $423 million. Insurer profits amount to $29 million, much lower than
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Figure 18: Distribution of Change in Probability Choosing Metal Tiers
(a) Silver Loading (b) Global Loading (c) No CSR
Notes: This set of figures show the distribution of change in probability that enrollees choose a certain
metal tier under respective CSR financing strategy relative to the probability that enrollees choose the same
metal tier at status quo. Each distribution is presented with a lower cap at -5% and a upper cap at 5%; the
probability mass beyond the caps are accumulated as probability bars at the two ends.
the government’s CSR payment. Should the CSR costs be transferred from the government
to the insurers, insurers will either suffer a net loss or increase premiums substantially to
keep break-even. At status quo, the return on public fund is $2.5 per dollar.
Silver Loading. De-funding of CSRs shifts the cost burden to insurers and consumers.
Column 2 reports a net insurers’ loss under silver loading with 2017 market participation.
While insurers bear the majority of CSR costs, the government spends $344 million more on
premium subsidies, indirectly financing part of the CSR costs. As a result, the government
only saves about 50% of its previously paid CSR costs. Because consumers experience
a net increase in out-of-pocket premiums, consumer surplus declines by $3 million. With
insurers’ net loss, the total social surplus decrease by $18 million. In this scenario, $1 saving
in government spending is at the cost of a $1.05 reduction in consumer and insurer surplus.
The silver loading with 2017 market participation does not speak fully for the CSR de-
funding consequences. As previously discussed, insurers will not operate at a negative profit.
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The net government saving shown in column (2) only suggests how restricting market exit
would limit insurers’ ability to survive when facing a large cost shock—the CSR costs in
the status quo are 23 times the size of insurers’ profit. Column (3) reports the simulated
welfare impact when sliver loading occurs after insurers adjusted market participation in
2018. With fewer insurers and fewer plans in Covered California, consumers experience a
greater increase in listed premium prices, including the SLCSP premiums. This results in
a $106 per month increase in per-capita premium subsidy. On the one hand, consumer
surplus increases by 37 million. On the other hand, the additional spending on premium
subsidy ($1,454 million) more than doubles the savings on CSRs. Insurer profits, although
positive, reduce by two-thirds. The social surplus reduces to $2 billion, with a $1 return on
a dollar of public spending.
Global Loading. Alternatively, global loading is less costly to public spending and less
discouraging to insurers. Column (4) reports the global loading welfare results where the
market participation is kept the same as in 2017. Because spreading the CSR costs to all
enrollees allows insurers to cover part of CSR cost from non-silver enrollees who do not
generate CSR costs, insurers are able to make a positive profit ($39 million) and remain
in the market. As shown in Panel C, the average total risk by coverage is similar between
column (2) and column (4), so is insurers’ cost-sharing. The higher premiums of bronze
and gold contribute to insurers’ profit. Compared to the 2018 silver loading condition, the
global loading allows the government to spend $659 million less on premium subsidies. In
this scenario, $1 of government outlay generates $1,94 of consumer and insurer surplus,
nearly doubling the return on public spending under 2018 silver loading.
No CSRs. When CSRs are removed, the enrollment rate decreases from 60 percent to
57 percent (Panel B, column 5). Especially, 5% of CSR-eligible households will leave the
exchange market. For the staying low-income households, their expected monthly medical
spending increase from $164 to $363, more than doubling in the absence of CSR subsidies.
Removing CSR provision changes the risk profile of all metal tiers. I find that the average
risk of households eligible for the 87% CSR silver plans decreases by 3 percent. Meanwhile,
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Table 20: Counterfactual Analysis on Welfare











CS 1,025 1,028 1,062 1,021 993
Π 29 -333 10 39 73
CS+Π 1,054 695 1,072 1,060 1,066
Govt. Outlay 423 81 1,071 548 556
Prem. Subsidies (+) 2,394 2,738 3,848 3,189 3,130
CSR benefits (+) 682 0 0 0 0
Avoided CU (–) 2,653 2,657 2,777 2,641 2,575
CS+Π-G 631 613 2 512 510
(CS+Π)/G 2.49 8.53 1.00 1.94 1.92
the average risk of bronze plans increases by 13 percent from $371 to $420 per month. The
average risk of gold plans increases by 2 percent from $484 to $496 per month, and the
average risk of platinum plans decreases by 3 percent from $648 to $628 per month.
Due to both reduced coverage and changes in net premiums, consumer surplus decreases
by 32 million. Compared to the status quo, the government spends $54 million more in
total subsidy payments and $78 million more in uncompensated care payments. The social
surplus reduces by $121 million, resulting in a return of $1.92 on a dollar of public spending.
From a policymaker’s perspective, CSR provision lowers the average risk on the exchanges,
hence reducing the premium subsidy payments via the price-linked subsidy and reducing
the potential spending on uncompensated care. Keeping the CSR provision aligns with the
public interest. It generates a $133 million net saving and a higher return of consumer and
insurer surplus on public spending. Counterfactuals also suggest that financing CSRs under
the status quo achieves the highest social welfare. The de-funding does not result in a net
government saving on total payment subsidizing the exchanges, and it impairs consumer
and insurer surplus. Should the de-funding continues, the global loading generates a better
outcome, as it keeps insurers’ incentives to participate in the exchange without a substantial
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increase in public spending.
Who Benefits. Change in consumer surplus varies by CSR funding scenarios. It is
important to emphasize that improvement or impairment of consumer surplus is not uniform
across income levels. As discussed in Section 4.3, consumers gain or lose depending on their
out-of-pocket premiums and the coverage level they change to. Because both factors vary
by income, I calculate the per-capita consumer surplus of each income level as a percentage
of FPL. Figure 19 plots the difference between the per-capita consumer surplus of each CSR
financing strategy and the status quo. Each colored curve is a fitted 5th degree polynomial
with respect to household income (as a percentage of FPL). The per-capita consumer surplus
change is similar under silver loading and global loading. Individual consumers have welfare
gains ranging from $0 to $20 under silver loading. The improvement is slightly smaller under
global loading. In either scenario, there is no significant difference in mean per-capita welfare
change across income levels, except the unsubsidized households who pay the full costs of
premium increases.
Among all counterfactual scenarios, removing CSR surplus has the most significant impact
on consumer surplus. With reduced benefit, one may expect that all CSR-eligible households
are worse off. However, facing lower out-of-pocket silver premiums, households eligible for
the low-level CSRs may not be hurt if their marginal disutility of premium is greater than
the marginal utility of coverage. The green line in Figure 19 shows that only households
with income below the 200% FPL are worse-off when CSRs are removed. For those who
have higher income, the benefits of lower net premiums outweigh the reduced coverage.
Measuring consumer surplus solely based on their willingness-to-pay for plans does not fully
reflect the externality of providing boarder insurance coverage to the society. As Pauly
(1968) pointed out, “some individuals may value positively other individuals’ consumption
of medical care.” In this context, individuals may derive utilities from improved insurance
coverage by others, event though their own coverage does not change. Note that this type
of externality differs from the conventionally defined social benefit, which I try to capture
102
Figure 19: Impact on Consumer Surplus by Income Level
by the avoided uncompensated care payment. While our data does not allow us to test
this possibility or quantify externality, it is likely to understate the consumer surplus in our
status quo, and even more so in the counterfactual simulation as the level of uncaptured
externality increases as more individual takes up insurance.
How CSRs should be financed. From a policymaker’s perspective, CSR provision low-
ers the average risk on the exchanges, hence reducing the premium subsidy payments via the
price-linked subsidy and reducing the potential spending on uncompensated care. Keeping
the CSR provision aligns with the public interest. It generates a $133 million net saving
and a higher return of consumer and insurer surplus on public spending. Counterfactuals
also suggest that financing CSRs under the status quo achieves the highest social welfare.
The de-funding does not result in a net government saving on total payment subsidizing the
exchanges, and it impairs consumer and insurer surplus. Should the de-funding continues,
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the global loading generates a better outcome, as it keeps insurers’ incentives to participate
in the exchange without a substantial increase in public spending.
4.7. Conclusion
This chapter analyzes the welfare effect of the federal CSR defunding where potential pre-
mium increases are intended to be offset by price-linked premium subsidies via a practice
of premium loading. Because the CSR benefits are required under the ACA, this study es-
sentially compares the welfare impact when the CSRs are funded by direct federal funding
under the status quo, with when the CSRs are indirect funded by federal paid premium
subsidies. The latter is subject to a pass-through greater than 1 (Chapter 3). Therefore,
the discussion pins down to how enrollees who benefit from the pass-through perceive those
benefits. The current analysis does not reflect the externality of subsidizing insurance pre-
miums, although it is likely to be an important justification for public financed coverage.
We find that should the CSRs be funded by premium loading, the total consumer surplus
is only marginally affected. However, the unsubsidized exchange enrollees are undoubtedly
worse-off across all loading strategies because of their full exposure to premium increases. In
California, although the unsubsidized had access to more affordable options off the exchange,
this population still accounted for more than 10 percent of the exchange enrollment after
the silver loading in 2018. It is beyond the scope of this paper to investigate how the
unsubsidized households shop across markets (i.e., on-exchange vs. off-exchange), but the
welfare loss by this group should they obtain coverage from the exchange must be taken
into consideration when determining how to finance the CSRs.
CSR provision is important to consumer surplus and public budget. Removing CSRs results
in a $32 million reduction in consumer surplus, primarily among households with income
below 200% FPL. It also increases public spending by $133 million, including $54 million
more on subsidizing the California exchange, and $79 million more on potential uncom-
pensated care payments. Overall, providing CSRs under the federal budget achieves the
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highest social surplus and return to public spending.
As pointed out earlier, the current analyses have several limitations. First, due to data
limitations, I model the costs using claims data from a single insurer. The model does not
capture the cost differences across insurers due to contracting with providers. In fact, the
predicted product-level average costs are about 3% higher than the insurer reported cost.
The overprediction in costs can bias the equilibrium predictions. Second, when calculat-
ing equilibrium premiums, I assume market participation is static, and insurers’ existing
decisions do not depend on the expected profit level. Thus it does not fully explain the
dynamic of insurers’ participation incentives in an imperfectly competitive market like the
exchanges. Extending the analyses in this paper to account for market dynamics are left as




A.1. Risk Score Construction
In this exercise, I apply HHS-HCC risk adjustment to claims of on-exchange members and
small group members in California.For each member-enrollment, we compute two risk scores
based on the HHS-HCC risk adjustment methodology. We compare the two HHS-HCC
based risk scores, summarize them by enrollment segment and metal tier, and add each of
them to the current difference-in-difference regression as a control variable and compare the
results.
HHS-HCC Risk Adjustment and Risk Score
The Affordable Care Act authorizes the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS)
to utilize criteria and methods similar to those utilized under Medicare Parts C or D to
implement risk adjustment. The purpose of risk adjustment is to lessen or eliminate the
influence of risk selection on the premiums that plans charge. The HHS risk adjustment
methodology is based on the premise that premiums should reflect the differences in plan
benefits, quality, and efficiency, and not the health status of the enrolled population. The
HHS risk adjustment methodology includes the risk adjustment model and the payment
transfer formula.
The HHS risk adjustment model uses an individual’s demographic data and diagnoses to
determine a risk score, which is a relative measure of how costly that individual is anticipated
to be to the plan (i.e. a relative measure of the individual’s actuarial risk to the plan). Risk
adjustment modeling determines the base actuarial risk based on predicted costs for a plan’s
enrollees.
Calculation of the HHS-HCC risk adjustment proceeds in the following steps:
1. Generate bins for age-gender.
2. Filter diagnosis based on a CPT/HCPCS code.
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3. Crosswalk ICD-10 CM diagnosis codes to generate CCs.
4. Apply hierarchy to generate HCCs.
5. Generate groups, severity measurement and interaction indicators for adult, child, and
infant populations. Each population has its own set of risk variables and corresponding
risk multipliers.
6. For an enrollee in a given metal level plan, the total predicted plan liability is the sum
of the incremental predicted plan liability (multipliers) from the relevant metal level
model. For adults and children, this is the sum of the age-gender, HCC, and disease
interaction multipliers. For infants, this is the sum of the maturity/disease-severity
category and additive sex multipliers, if male. Separating models by metal tiers is
intended to capture the insurer’s cost-sharing that vary by metal tiers.
The methodology and a DIY instruction on risk score calculation are available on the CMS
website1. This exercise translates the DIY program to Stata.
Application of the HHS-HCC to CA claims Data
I apply the HHS-HCC risk adjustment model to the proprietary claims data, which contains
22% California on-exchange enrollees that who enrolled via a major insurer in 2017.
The 2017 HHS-HCC risk adjustment includes in the adult model a baseline factor of enroll-
ment duration. The enrollment duration factor is additive to the HCC and demographic
factors. In recognition that members enrolling for a shorter period of time tend to incur
higher medical consumption (adverse selection in enrollment duration), shorter enrollment
duration corresponds to a greater multiplier. The enrollment duration component is in the
same spirit as we use annualized medical consumption as the outcome variable. We thus
leave the enrollment duration component in the risk adjustment as it is.
1The risk score algorithm accessible at https://www.cms.gov/CCIIO/Resources/Regulations-and-
Guidance/Downloads/Updated-CY2018-DIY-instructions.pdf
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The 2017 HHS-HCC risk adjustment also adjusts for induced demand due to cost-sharing
reduction (CSR). Because CSR plans have higher actuarial value, members of CSR plans
presumably utilize more care due to their lower cost-sharing. Because the adjustment for
CSR is based on moral hazard, not the explicit or hidden health risk, I exclude the CSR
adjustment part in the risk score calculation.
Recall that the HHS-HCC score accounts for the insurer’s cost-sharing that differ by metal
tiers. That is, for any given HCC or demographic factor, the corresponding risk multiplier
is higher for a member enrolled in a Platinum plan than that for a member enrolled in a
Silver plan. This, however, defeats the purpose of calculating the risk score. Our goal of
adding a risk score as a control variable is to absorb the effects of health status on medical
consumption, assuming those effects do not vary plan choice. In other words, the ideal
risk score should ignore the plan’s liability. As a result, I calculate a second risk score,
a “baseline” risk score such that, regardless of a member’s actual metal tier, I apply a
Bronze plan’s HCC and demographic multipliers to that members’ diagnosis. By forcing
every HCC and demographic factor to have the same risk multiplier across all metal tiers,
the “baseline” risk score ignores plan’s liability and only captures members’ health risk.
The “baseline” risk score is highly correlated with the HHS-HCC risk score (correlation =
0.99).
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A.2. Summary Statistics of Covered California












1 69.25% 52.77% 70.24% 53.42%
2 22.39% 29.27% 21.67% 28.52%
3 5.14% 9.23% 4.93% 9.16%
4 2.61% 5.26% 2.54% 5.48%
>4 0.62% 3.47% 0.63% 3.43%
Income
138% to 150% FPL 15.65% 2.05% 16.33% 1.59%
150% to 200% FPL 33.83% 10.86% 32.79% 10.24%
200% to 250% FPL 17.75% 11.81% 18.25% 11.42%
250% to 400% FPL 21.31% 28.44% 22.17% 28.25%
>400% FPL 11.46% 46.84% 10.47% 48.49%
Subsidy eligibility
Premium subsidy 88.54% 53.16% 89.53% 51.51%
(Received) 83.15% - 85.86%
CSR subsidy 67.24% 24.72% 67.36% 23.26%
(Received) 49.24% - 45.31%
Average age
<20 1.58% 1.69% 1.53% 1.82%
21-30 21.40% 24.27% 21.38% 23.79%
31-40 22.28% 33.48% 22.50% 34.57%
41-50 18.08% 23.05% 17.80% 21.78%
51-60 24.79% 13.42% 24.60% 14.12%
61-64 11.87% 4.08% 12.20% 3.92%








continued next page . . .
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Share of $0 plans
$0 Bronze 45.79% 5.39% 61.38% 19.74%
$0 Silver 4.63% 0.50% 8.89% 1.32%






A.3. Impact of Silver Loading among Unsubsidized Enrollees
Figure 20: Silver Loading Impact on Demand and unsubsidized Enrollee Sorting
(a) Silver vs. Bronze vs. Uninsurance (b) Gold vs. Silver vs. Bronze
Notes: The graphs show the equilibrium changes due to silver loading among the unsubsidized households.
The key exogenous changes is the upward shift of silver AC due to the silver loading. Because households
do not receive premium subsidies, there is no change in WTP curves. Panel (a) shows that higher silver AC
curve results in individuals switching from silver to bronze. Panel (b) shows the equilibrium effect passes on
to gold, where the gold demand shift upwards, and individuals on the left margin of silver switch to gold.
Figure 21: Welfare Impact on Unsubsidized Enrollees by Silver Loading
(a) Silver vs. Bronze vs. Uninsurance (b) Gold vs. Silver vs. Bronze
Notes: The graphs show social welfare impact of silver loading on unsubsidized households. Panel (a) shows
the case that consumers switch on the intensive margin between bronze and silver. The solid lines are WTP
net the difference in plan costs, and net increased premium subsidy. The welfare loss by silver consumers
who switches to bronze is shaded in red. Panel (b) shows welfare impact on consumers who switch from
silver to gold.
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A.4. Validation of Plan-Level Risk Prediction
Figure 22: Comparison of Predicted and Reported Plan-Level Total Risk
Notes: This figure compares the predicted average risk and the CCIIO reported average risk at product
level. Product is defined as a superset of plans offered in multiple rating areas that share the same financial
and non-financial features. In the Health Insurance Oversight System (HIOS), product is defined by unique
plan identifiers. The cost model predicts average risk at plan level, or product-region level. To compare
prediction with reported average risk, I aggregate total predicted plan-level risk at product level and divided
by product-level enrollment. The horizontal axis is the product-level average risk measured by PMPM
allowed amount. The vertical axis is the product-level predicted average risk. Each circle corresponds to
a product, with the radius proportional to the product’s total enrollment. The circles align along the 45
degree line. Regression of the predicted average risk on the reported risk suggests a correlation of 1.03, CI
= [1, 1.06]. The regression result reject correlation of 1 just at 5% level (F-value = 0.46).
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